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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
All of the parties to this appeal are shown on the 
caption of the case shown on the front cover. In addition to 
the parties named in the caption, Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
("Mountain Fuel") is an entity directly affected by the outcome 
of this case. The parcel of real property at issue in this 
quiet title action was sold by plaintiff/respondent Interstate 
Land Corporation ("Interstate") to Mountain Fuel (along with 
other property not at issue in this case) on or about December 
20, 1985. Interstate is a sister company of Mountain Fuel. 
The sale from Interstate to Mountain Fuel was pursuant to an 
exchange agreement supported by valuable consideration. 
Pursuant to one of the terms of the exchange agreement, 
Interstate agreed to diligently pursue this action to clear 
title to the disputed tract for the benefit of Mountain Fuel. 
Pursuant to Rule 25(c), U.R.C.P., Interstate will continue to 
prosecute this action as the plaintiff/respondent 
notwithstanding Interstate's transfer of the real property to 
Mountain Fuel. The lower court was made aware of the foregoing 
facts and of Mountain Fuel's interest in the property in 
question. (R. 94, 198). 
i 
SPECIAL PRELIMINARY MATTER: 
OBJECTION TO COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS 
As a preliminary matter, Interstate hereby renews its 
objection to attorneys Ronald C. Barker and Larry L. Whyte as 
counsel for the five appellants. As noted on the caption, the 
five appellants include R. D. Patterson ("Mr. Patterson") and 
Melvin E. Ingersoll, Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. 
Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll (the "Ingersolls"). 
Interstate filed a motion in the Supreme Court for summary 
disposition and a supporting memorandum on or about February 3, 
1987. Although that motion was not granted, Interstate does 
not believe that the Court ever reached the merits of 
Interstate's request therein for an order disqualifying 
appellant's counsel due to a conflict of interest between the 
appellants. 
Interstate believes that it is improper for Mr. 
Patterson and the four Ingersolls to be represented by the same 
lawyers because Mr. Patterson is named as a defendant in the 
Ingersolls' proposed complaint in intervention. It is 
difficult to imagine any situation where parties on opposite 
sides of the same case can be zealously represented by the same 
lawyers. See Comments to Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct (effective January 1, 1988) ("Paragraph (a) [of Rule 
1.7] prohibits representation of opposing parties in 
litigation.") 
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THE SUPREME COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS 
APPEAL BECAUSE IT WAS NOT FILED IN A TIMELY MANNER 
The Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal because the five appellants — Mr. Patterson and the 
four Ingersolls — failed to file a notice of appeal as 
required within thirty days after entry of a final order by the 
lower court, as required by Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. On September 4, 1986, the lower court entered 
separate orders denying the Ingersolls' motion to intervene and 
granting Interstatefs motion for summary judgment against Mr. 
Patterson. (R. 1:146-153). A copy of the lower court order 
denying the Ingersolls' motion to intervene is attached to this 
Brief as Addendum Exhibit K. A copy of the lower court order 
granting Interstate's motion for summary judgment against Mr. 
Patterson is attached to this Brief as Addendum Exhibit L. 
Within ten days of entry of the foregoing final 
orders, Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls filed a document with 
the lower court somewhat awkwardly entitled "Motion to Correct 
Order or for a New Trial re Order Denying Ingersolls' Motion 
for Permission to File Complaint in Intervention and Granting 
Summary Judgment Against Patterson." (R. 1:154-162) 
(hereinafter the "Motion to Correct Order"). The "Motion to 
Correct Order" was heard by the Honorable Michael R. Murphy on 
October 20, 1986. At the hearing, Judge Murphy sua sponte 
raised the procedural question whether Mr. Patterson and the 
Ingersolls were entitled to file the so-called "Motion to 
Correct Order." (R. 1:229-230). Mr. Patterson and the 
Ingersolls claimed that their "Motion to Correct Order" was 
authorized by Rules 59(a)(6) and (7), 59(d), 59(e), and 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 1:154). At the end 
of the hearing, Judge Murphy took the matter under advisement. 
(R. 1:176; 1:244-245). Thereafter, on December 2, 1986, Judge 
Murphy issued a ten-page "Memorandum Opinion and Order." (R. 
1:177-186) (hereinafter the "Memorandum Opinion"). 
A copy of Judge Murphy's Memorandum Opinion is 
attached to this brief as Addendum Exhibit M and is hereby 
incorporated by reference. Judge Murphy reached four main 
conclusions in his Memorandum Opinion. First, Judge Murphy 
held that the "Motion to Correct Order" filed by Mr. Patterson 
and the Ingersolls subsequent to entry of the final orders of 
September 4, 1987 was not authorized by any of the 
aforementioned Rules of Civil Procedure relied upon by them. 
(R. 1:177-86). Second, Judge Murphy concluded that even if one 
of those rules -- namely, Rule 59(e), U.R.C.P. -- might in some 
cases be applicable to a motion to alter or amend a summary 
judgment, it does not authorize a party to file a motion to 
alter or amend an adverse summary judgment when the party 
seeking reconsideration argues no new facts or law. (R. 
1:184). Third, Judge Murphy held that even if Mr. Patterson 
could file a Rule 59(e) motion, the Ingersolls were not even 
allowed to join the case as parties, so they at least had to 
appeal from the order denying their intervention within thirty 
days. (R. 1:184-85). Fourth, and in the alternative to a 
procedural disposition, Judge Murphy reached the merits. Judge 
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Murphy "considered the entire record and [found] no manifest 
error underlying the orders entered on September 4, 1986." (R. 
1:185). Interstate's contention that the Supreme Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal is directly supported by the 
analysis in Judge Murphy's Memorandum Opinion. (R. 1:185). 
Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls cite the decision in 
Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d 343 (10th Cir., 1983) in support of 
the legitimacy of their "Motion to Correct Order." In 
Vreeken, it is true that the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit held under Rule 59(e) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure that a motion to file an amended 
complaint filed after entry of an adverse motion for summary 
judgment would toll the period for appeal. 718 F.2d at 345. 
Vreeken seems to hold that "regardless of how it is styled or 
construed by the trial court, a motion filed within ten days of 
the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the 
judgment is properly treated as a Rule 59(e) motion." 718 F.2d 
at 345 (citation omitted). The Utah Supreme Court should not 
follow Vreeken because the rule announced in Vreeken does not 
make sense. In Vreeken, the court ignored the plain meaning 
of a motion and held that a motion to file an amended complaint 
was somehow intended to be a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment. Moreover, whatever might be the case in federal 
courts, "Utah has adopted the majority rule that an order of 
dismissal is a final adjudication, and thereafter a plaintiff 
may not file an amended complaint." Nichols v. State, 554 
P.2d 231, 232 (Utah 1986). At the very least, even if this 
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Court follows Vreeken, only Mr. Patterson1s appeal should be 
deemed to be timely. The Ingersolls were not allowed to 
intervene, so they were not entitled to file a Rule 59(e) 
motion that might have been available to Mr. Patterson under 
the Vreeken rule. 
Interstate recognizes that the courts are split on the 
question whether a party like Mr. Patterson (but not: the 
Ingersolls) can bring a motion to reconsider under Rule 59(e) 
subsequent to entry of a summary judgment. See cases cited in 
the Memorandum Opinion at R. 1:183-84; those pages of the 
record are reproduced at pages 7 & 8 of Addendum Exhibit M to 
this Brief. The better rule is to encourage parties who have 
lost a motion for summary judgment which is expressly styled as 
a final order to end the litigation based on the strength of 
the judge's ruling or, in the alternative, to file a notice of 
appeal within thirty days after entry of that summary 
judgment. A party who has lost a motion to intervene must 
likewise perfect an appeal within thirty days. The rule urged 
by Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls undermines the finality of 
judgments by the court, and is not authorized within the four 
corners of either the intervention rule — Rule 24, U.R.C.P. --
or the summary judgment rule -- Rule 56, U.R.C.P. 
Rule 59(e), U.R.C.P. provides: "A motion to alter or 
amend the judgment shall be served to not later than ten days 
after entry of the judgment." Rule 59(e) merely recognizes the 
inherent power of a court over its judgments. It is not 
designed to provide a vehicle for general reargument and 
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reconsideration of summary judgments once entered under Rule 56 
or of intervention rulings under Rule 24. 
In Durkin v. Taylor, 444 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Va. 
1977), the court held that Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure does not authorize the party who has lost a 
motion for summary judgment to file a "motion to alter 
judgment/' The court in Durkin explained: 
Although plaintiff has labeled his motion a 
"Motion to Alter Judgment" allegedly pursuant to 
Rule 59(e), in actuality the plaintiff is moving 
the Court to reverse its order granting summary 
judgment to defendant and instead grant summary 
judgment to plaintiff or, in the alternative, 
grant plaintiff a trial of an allegedly disputed 
material fact. 
The plaintiff in his brief brings forward no 
matter that could have been argued before 
judgment was entered herein. His brief in 
support of his motion is no more than an 
expression of a view of the law contrary to that 
set forth in the Court's opinion. Whatever may 
be the purpose of Rule 59(e) it should not be 
supposed that it is intended to give an unhappy 
litigant one additional chance to sway the judge. 
Since the plaintiff has brought up nothing 
new -- except his displeasure -- this Court has 
no proper basis upon which to alter or amend the 
order previously entered. Judgment may indeed be 
based upon an erroneous view of the law, but, if 
so, the proper recourse is appeal — not 
reargument. 
This Court considers that no appropriate 
Rule 59(e) motion has been filed. Support for 
this holding may be found in Erickson Tool Co. v. 
Ballas Collet Co., 277 F. Supp. 226, 234 (N.D. 
Ohio 1967), aff'd, 404 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1968). 
. . . To the same effect and more directly on 
point is Blair v. Delta Airlines, Inc.» 344 F. 
Supp. 367, 368 (S.D. Fla. 1972). 
444 F. Supp. at 889-90. What was said above in Durkin applies 
_ c_ 
to the "Motion to Correct Order" filed in this case by Mr. 
Patterson and the Ingersolls. 
As noted in the Memorandum Opinion (see Addendum 
Exhibit M to this Brief) neither Mr. Patterson nor the 
Ingersolls filed any objection to the proposed orders which 
were prepared by counsel for Interstate after the May 5, 1986 
hearing and the July 28, 1986 minute entry, even though 
Interstate complied with the requirements of Rule 2.9(b) of the 
Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuits Courts of 
the State of Utah. See Certificates of Service at Addendum 
Exhibits K and L; R. 1:148 and 1:153. Rule 2.9(b) provides: 
"Copies of proposed Findings, Judgments, and/or Orders shall be 
served on opposing counsel before being presented to the court 
for signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of 
objections thereto shall be submitted to the Court and counsel 
within (5) days after service." (emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court in Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233 
(Utah 1983) stated: 
Rule 2.9(b), Rules of Practice in the District 
and Circuit Courts, requires that copies of 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
be served in opposing counsel before being 
presented to the court for signature. The 
requirement of service on the losing counsel is 
for the purpose of permitting him to make 
objections and propose amendments. 
660 P.2d at 235 (emphasis added). Accord, Calfo v. D. C. 
Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986); Wayne Garff 
Construction Co., Inc. v. Richards, 706 P.2d 1065 (Utah 
1985). It is extremely inappropriate for a party to make no 
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objection in the lower court to a proposed order as required by 
Rule 2.9 and then to complain on appeal about the proposed 
order, as Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls do at pages 11 and 
12 of their Brief. In any event, by not objecting under Rule 
2.9(b), Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls effectively concede in 
their Brief that the two orders appealed from (Addendum 
Exhibits K and L) do not "differ from the Court's announced 
decision" and are "properly worded to accurately [state] the 
substance of the Court's ruling." See Appellants' Brief at 20. 
Interstate agrees with Judge Murphy that l3ae holding 
in Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray, 590 P.2d 3®5., 310 (11 
Utah 1979) is not dispositive of the jurisdictional question. 
The Rule 59(e) motion at issue in Hume was not an attempt to 
reargue a motion for summary judgment. Rather, the issue in 
Hume was whether a party could file a rule 55(e) motion to 
alter or amend a final judgment denying a writ of msandamus. As 
Judge Murphy noted, there are more opportunities generally 
available for parties and advocates to present argument and 
evidence in the context of a motion for summary judgment than 
in the context of the petition for writ of mandamus. Also, Mr. 
Patterson and the Ingersolls made no objections of tihe orders 
under Rule 2.9(b) of the Rules of Practice. As such., the 
rationale in Hume should not be extended to allow litigants to 
file motions to reconsider summary judgments entered against 
them. 
There is also no merit to the reliance by Mr. 
Patterson and the Ingersolls on Rules 59(a)(6) or 55(a)(7), 
U.R.C.P. since those rules only apply to post-trial motions. 
By definition, entry of a summary judgment means that there was 
no trial because there were no material facts in dispute. Rule 
59(d), U.R.C.P. also does not apply because that rule only 
applies to new trials granted at the initiative of the Court. 
Also, Rule 60(b) does not apply because the Motion to Correct 
Order filed by Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls did not fit 
within any of the seven categories in that rule. 
The rest of this brief discusses the merits of the 
appeal filed by Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
There are only two issues on appeal. The first issue 
on appeal is whether the lower court properly granted 
Interstate's motion for summary judgment against Mr. 
Patterson. See Addendum Exhibit L to this Brief. The effect 
of granting Interstatefs motion for summary judgment against 
Mr. Patterson was to quiet title to the Vacated Street Property 
at issue in this case in favor of Interstate. The lower court 
held that Mr. Patterson acquired no interest in the Vacated 
Street Property under a certain quit claim deed (Addendum 
Exhibit J) given to him by one LeMel Corporation (R. 1:150). 
The second issue on appeal is whether the lower court 
properly denied the Ingersolls1 motion to intervene. See 
Addendum Exhibit K to this Brief. The Ingersolls want to 
intervene to allege causes of action against both Interstate 
and Mr. Patterson to quiet title in themselves to the Vacated 
Street Property, either as a matter of record title or as a 
-8-
matter of adverse possession. (R. 1:112-142). In the lower 
court, Interstate objected to the Ingersolls' motion to 
intervene based on the doctrine of res judicata and/or 
collateral estoppel, and on the merits. (R. 1:197-200). 
VERBATIM TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all determinative statutes and rules are 
set forth above or in the main argument section of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings Below and Lower 
Court Disposition 
This is a quiet title action. The real property in 
dispute is located in Salt Lake City and is referred to herein 
as the Vacated Street Property. The Vacated Street Property is 
described more particularly in this Brief, infra, at 
Undisputed Fact Nos. 19-23. The lower court quieted title to 
the Vacated Street Property in favor of Interstate as against 
Mr. Patterson. The lower court also denied the Ingersolls' 
motion to intervene based on the doctrines of res judicata 
and/or collateral estoppel. For a more detailed recitation of 
the facts concerning the proceedings below and the disposition 
by the lower Court, see the Orders attached hereto as Addendum 
Exhibits K and L and Judge Murphy's Memorandum Opinion attached 
to this Brief as Addendum Exhibit M. (R. 1:177-186). 
B. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Appeal. 
In the lower court proceeding, Interstate asserted 
that there were twenty-six undisputed material facts that would 
authorize the lower court to enter summary judgment in favor of 
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Interstate against Mr. Patterson. Also, in the lower court 
proceeding, certified copies of the relevant deeds and other 
documents of record were attached as exhibits A through J to 
Interstatefs Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 1:16-69). 
Undisputed Fact Nos. 1 through 26 in this Brief are identical 
to Undisputed Fact Nos. 1 through 26 urged by Interstate in the 
lower court. The lower court order granting Interstate's 
motion for summary judgment against Mr. Patterson expressly 
incorporated by reference and adopted as undisputed findings of 
the Court Fact Nos. 1 through 26. (R. 1:150). 
Attached to this Brief as Addendum Exhibits A through 
J are true and correct copies of the documents referenced in 
the Undisputed Facts and which are included as part of the 
lower court record at 1:16-69. Also, attached to this Brief as 
Addendum Exhibit N is a true and correct copy of a map which 
was attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Licensed Surveyor 
Raymond L. Griffith. Addendum Exhibit N is a copy of R. 1:84. 
The map at Addendum Exhibit N depicts the Vacated Street 
Property at issue in this litigation. 
Fact Nos. 27-44 in this Brief are based on the 
undisputed facts in the record in the case of Salt Lake City 
Corporation v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County, Civil No. C78-7764 (hereinafter the 
"Salt Lake City Case"). In the lower court proceedings in this 
case, Interstate submitted the file in the Salt Lake City Case 
as the basis for Interstatefs objection to the IngersollsT 
motion to intervene. (R. 1:198). In the lower court 
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proceeding in this case, and on appeal, Interstate maintains 
that the Ingersolls should not be allowed to file their 
proposed complaint in intervention based on the doctrine of res 
judicata and/or collateral estoppel. The lower court in this 
case reviewed the file in the Salt Lake City Case to reach the 
merits of Interstatefs res judicata and/or collateral estoppel 
argument against the Ingersolls. (R. 1:198). As such, Volume 
II of the record on appeal in this case includes the relevant 
portions of the record in the Salt Lake City Case. 
In preparing the record on appeal in this case, the 
Clerk of the Third District Court prepared two volumes. Volume 
I of the record contains the relevant papers filed in the lower 
court proceeding in this case, plus the hearing transcripts. 
Volume II of the record contains the relevant papers filed in 
the Salt Lake City Case and reviewed by the lower court in this 
case. In preparing the two volumes of the record in this case, 
the Clerk of the District Court numbered each volume starting 
from page 1. Accordingly, references in this Brief to the 
lower court record in this case distinguish between Volume I 
and Volume II. For example, page 37 of Volume I is designated 
as R. 1:37; whereas page 37 in Volume 2 is designated as R. 
11:37. No appeal was ever taken by any of the parties, 
including the Ingersolls, from the various judgments entered in 
the Salt Lake City Case. 
1. The real property at issue in this appeal 
consists of approximately one-half acre of land located on the 
west side of Salt Lake City near the intersection of First 
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South Street and 1100 West Street. Affidavit of R. Donn Hilton 
at II 2. (R. 1:105). 
2. The disputed property, which will be referred to 
herein as the "Vacated Street Property", used to be part of 
First South Street and part of Glendale Street, a north-south 
street which intersects with First South between 1100 and 1200 
West. Affidavit of R. Donn Hilton at If 3. (R. 1:106). 
3. The Vacated Street Property was transferred from 
public ownership to private ownership by an Ordinance passed by 
the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah on October 
5, 1977 and published October 15, 1977. By its terms, the 
Ordinance took effect 30 days after its first publication 
(i.e., it took effect November 14, 1977). Specifically, 
insofar as relevant to Interstate's dispute with Mr. Patterson, 
the west half of Glendale Street and the south half of First 
South Street west of 1100 West in Salt Lake City, Utah were 
vacated (along with other property not at issue in this case) 
by enactment of the aforesaid Ordinance. A true and correct 
copy of said Ordinance is attached to InterstateTs Brief as 
Addendum Exhibit T . Affidavit of R. Donn Hilton at If 4. (R. 
1:106). 
4. Each property owner adjoining the Vacated Street 
Property acquired fee title free of the former street easements 
up to the midpoint of the old streets. Affidavit of R. Donn 
Hilton at IF 5. (R. 1:106). 
5. At the time the ordinance was passed and the 
Vacated Street Property reverted, the owner of record of what 
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will be referred to herein as the "Brewery Property" on the 
south side of First South Street and on the West side of 
Glendale Street was Backman Abstract & Title Company, as 
trustee under that certain Trust Deed dated July 6, 1977 
(hereinafter the "July 6, 1977 Trust Deed"). Affidavit of R. 
Donn Hilton at 11 6. (R. 1:106-07). 
6. The July 6, 1977 Trust Deed was recorded July 18, 
1977 at Book 4519, Page 1159 in the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office. Affidavit of R. Donn Hilton at 11 6, (R. 1:107). 
7. A copy of the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed is attached 
to Interstatefs Brief as Addendum Exhibit A. As stated in the 
July 6, 1977 Trust Deed, the trustors conveyed the described 
land, "Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements 
thereon and all water rights, rights-of-way, easements, rents, 
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges 
and appurtenances thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed 
with said property, or any part thereof." (R. 1:19). 
8. The trustors identified in the July 6, 1977 Trust 
Deed are LeMel Corporation, a Utah corporation, and the 
Ingersolls (i.e., the appellants in this case -- Melvin E. 
Ingersoll and Marian Beverly Ingersoll, his wife, and Leland R. 
Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll, his wife). See Addendum 
Exhibit A to this Brief. (R. 1:17). 
9. The beneficiary named in the July 6, 1977 Trust 
Deed is General Brewing Company, a California corporation. See 
Addendum Exhibit A attached to Interstatefs Brief. (R. 1:17). 
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10. On or about August 31, 1979, General Brewing 
Company, the beneficiary under the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed, 
appointed Richard L. Blanck as the successor trustee under the 
July 6, 1977 Trust Deed. A copy of the "Substitution of 
Trustee" document recorded October 19, 1978 at Book 1968, Page 
1090 at the Salt Lake County Recorder's is attached to 
Interstate's Brief as Addendum Exhibit C. (R. 1:26-29). 
11. On September 7, 1979 and again on October 22, 
1979, Richard L. Blanck, the successor trustee under the July 
6, 1977 Trust Deed, filed "Notice of Default" documents with 
the Salt Lake County Recorder. The first default document was 
recorded September 7, 1979 at Book 4939, page 1141. The second 
was recorded October 22, 1979 at Book 4969, Page 1069. True 
and correct copies of the two Notice of Default documents are 
attached to Interstate's Brief as Addendum Exhibits D and E, 
respectively. (R. 1:31-39). 
12. As stated more particularly in the aforesaid 
Notice of Default documents, the trustors named in the July 6, 
1977 Trust Deed had defaulted on a note in favor of the 
beneficiary, General Brewing Company, in the sum of 
$1,800,000.00. (R. 1:31 and 35). 
13. LeMel Corporation, one of the trustors named with 
the Ingersolls in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed, filed a Chapter 
11 petition for relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code 
with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Utah in Case No. 80-0755 on or about May 6, 1980. The case was 
converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding September 23, 1981 and was 
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closed April 3, 1986. See Affidavit of R. Donn Hilton at IT 
10. (R. 1:107). 
14. On or about May 6, 1980, an undated Quit-Claim 
Deed was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder at Book 
5097, Page 1134, by the individuals named as trustors in the 
July 6, 1977 Trust Deed. The Ingersolls quit-claimed to LeMel 
Corporation whatever right, title or interest they may then 
have had in the same trust property described in the July 6, 
1977 Trust Deed. A true and correct copy of the May 6, 1980 
Quit-Claim Deed from the Ingersolls to LeMel Corporation is 
attached to Interstate's Brief as Addendum Exhibit F. (R. 
1:41). 
15. NACM Intermountain, Inc. became the duly 
appointed qualified and acting trustee of the bankruptcy estate 
of LeMel Corporation. See Affidavit of R. Donn Hilton at 1F 
11. (R. 1:41-44). 
16. After notice and the opportunity for parties in 
interest to be heard, United States Bankruptcy Judge Ralph R. 
Mabey entered an order May 27, 1982 authorizing NACM 
Intermountain, Inc., in its capacity as trustee of the LeMel 
Corporation bankruptcy estate, to sell the same property 
described in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed back to the 
beneficiary named in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed -- General 
Brewing Company. A true and correct copy of Judge Mabey's 
"Order With Respect to Trustee's Intent to Sell Real Property" 
is attached to Interstatefs Brief as Addendum Exhibit G. (R. 
1:46-52). 
17. As stated in Judge Mabeyfs Order, NACM 
Intermountain, Inc., as the trustee of the LeMel Corporation 
bankruptcy estate, was also authorized by the Court to convey 
to General Brewing Company not only the same real property 
expressly described more particularly in the July 6, 1977 Trust 
Deed (i.e., the Brewery Property), but also the contiguous 
portions of the vacated First South Street west of 1100 West 
Street and the vacated portions of Glendale Street north of 
First South Street (i.e., the Vacated Street Property). See 
Addendum Exhibit G (Judge Mabey's Order) attached to 
Interstate's Brief. (R. 1:46-47). 
18. On or about June 3, 1982, NACM Intermountain, 
Inc., the duly appointed qualified and acting trustee of the 
bankruptcy estate of LeMel Corporation, conveyed to General 
Brewing Company by a Trustee's Deed all of the LeMel 
Corporation bankruptcy estate's right, title or interest in the 
same seven parcels of real property described in the July 6, 
1977 Trust Deed (i.e., the Brewery Property), as well as the 
Vacated Street Property described in Judge Mabey's Order 
authorizing the conveyance. A certified copy of the "June 3, 
1982 Trustee's Deed" from NACM to General Brewing Company, 
which was recorded June 9, 1982 at Book 5381, Page 827, at the 
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, is attached to Interstate's 
Brief as Addendum Exhibit H. (R. 1:54-60). 
19. The Vacated Street Property conveyed by the 
bankruptcy trustee to General Brewing Company is identified in 
the June 3, 1982 Trustee's Deed as parcel No. 8 and parcel No. 
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9. See Addendum Exhibit H attached to Interstatefs Brief. (R. 
1:56). 
20. Parcel No. 8 is described in the June 3, 1982 
Trustee's Deed as follows: 
The following described portion of vacated First 
South Street being the South one-half of Vacated 
First South Street lying between the West line of 
1100 West Street and the West line of Glendale 
Street produced across First South Street: 
BEGINNING at a point 66.045 feet South of the 
Northwest Corner of 1100 West and 100 South, 
which corner is also the Southeast corner of Lot 
1, Block 54, Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and 
running thence South 66.045 feet; thence West 
330.0 feet; thence North 66.045 feet; thence East 
330.0 feet to the point of beginning. 
See Addendum Exhibit H to Interstate's Brief. (R. 1:56). 
21. Parcel No. 9 is described in the June 3, 1982 
Trustee's Deed as follows: 
The following described portion of vacated 
Glendale Street: Beginning at the Southeast 
corner of Lot 1, Block 2, Jones Subdivision of 
Block 54, Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and 
running thence North 82.5 feet; thence North 
33°42f East 59.48 feet; thence South 132.0 feet; 
thence West 33 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with the North one-half of vacated First 
South Street adjoining on the South. 
See Addendum Exhibit H to Interstatefs Brief. (R. 1:56). 
22. On February 7, 1984, General Brewing Company, a 
California corporation, conveyed by Special Warranty Deed to 
Interstate the exact same nine parcels of real property 
described more particularly in the June 3, 1982 Trustee's Deed, 
including the Vacated Street Property described more 
particularly in Parcels Nos. 8 and 9 thereof. The Special 
Warranty Deed was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder 
February 14, 1986 at Book 5531, Page 545 (hereinafter the 
February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed). A true and correct 
copy of the February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed is attached 
to Interstate's Brief as Addendum Exhibit I. (R. 1:61-66). 
23. The Vacated Street Property described more 
particularly as Parcels Nos. 8 and 9 in the February 14, 1984 
Special Warranty Deed is exactly the same Vacated Street 
Property described more particularly in the March 11, 1982 
Quit-Claim Deed (under which Mr. Patterson claims an interest) 
and a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A to Mr. Patterson's 
Answer. See Affidavit of Raymond L. Griffith at If 4. (R. 
1:4-8 and 1:70-71). 
24. A true and correct copy of the March 11, 1982 
Quit-Claim Deed from LeMel to Mr. Patterson is attached to 
Interstatefs Brief as Addendum Exhibit J. The Quit-Claim Deed 
attached as Addendum Exhibit J to Interstatefs Brief was 
recorded at Book 5349, Page 1360 of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office March 11, 1982 and is referred to hereinafter 
as the March 11, 1982 Quit-Claim Deed. (R. 1:68). 
25. Although the March 11, 1982 Quit-Claim Deed was 
recorded March 11, 1982, it purportedly bears an execution date 
of July 27, 1979. Although Interstate reserves the right, if 
necessary, to later challenge the alleged July 27, 1979 
execution date, and to raise defenses pertaining to the alleged 
acknowledgement at that time in front of a notary, Interstate 
stipulates for purposes of this appeal from the summary 
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judgment that the March 11, 1982 Quit-claim Deed was executed 
by LeMel Corporation July 27, 1979 and acknowledged by a notary 
public on that date. (R. 1:93). 
26. The March 11, 1982 Quit-claim Deed executed by 
LeMel Corporation July 27, 1979 was a document of record when 
General Brewing Company conveyed the February 14, 1984 Special 
Warranty Deed to Interstate. (R. 1:93). 
27. After Salt Lake City Corporation adopted the 
aforementioned ordinances vacating First South Street and 
Glendale Avenue (i.e., the Vacated Street Property), Salt Lake 
City Corporation purported to rescind the ordinances vacating 
those streets. When the adjacent property owners objected to 
the alleged recission, Salt Lake City Corporation filed an 
action in Third Judicial District Court. The action was styled 
as Salt Lake City Corporation v. Mountain Fuel Supply, Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County, Civil No. C-78-7764 
(hereinafter the "Salt Lake City Case"). Salt Lake City 
Corporation filed a "Complaint and Petition for Injunctive 
Relief" beginning the aforementioned action on or about 
December 14, 1978. (R. 11:2-10). 
28. On or about January 5, 1979, LeMel Corporation, 
and the same Ingersolls who are appellants in this case, filed 
a motion to intervene in the Salt Lake City Case. (R. 
11:24-25). The Ingersolls' and LeMels' motion to intervene in 
the Salt Lake City Case came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Christine M. Durham, District Judge. By order of 
January 18, 1979, District Judge Durham allowed LeMel 
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Corporation and the Ingersolls to join the case as parties 
plaintiffs adverse to Mountain Fuel. Pursuant to Judge 
Durham's order, the pleadings of Salt Lake City were adopted by 
the intervenors in the Salt Lake City Case. (R. 11:29-30). 
29. In a "Memorandum of Points and Authorities" 
submitted on or about January 30, 1979 by the Ingersolls in the 
Salt Lake City Case in opposition to a motion to dismiss filed 
by Mountain Fuel, the Ingersolls stated: "The complaint [in 
the Salt Lake City Case] essentially alleges that a certain 
public street was vacated by the plaintiff by an ordinance in 
that the vacation has been rescinded by a subsequent ordinance, 
but that the defendant [i.e., Mountain Fuel] has refused to 
recognize the subsequent ordinance and is treating the street 
as if it [i.e., Mountain Fuel] were the owner of the property 
and is preventing public access." (R. 11:31). 
30. On or about April 4, 1979, the intervenors in the 
Salt Lake City Case filed a motion seeking permission to "file 
their own complaint independent from the complaint of the 
plaintiff [i.e., Salt Lake City Corporation] which was 
previously adopted." (R. 11:87). The intervenors in the Salt 
Lake City Case asked to file an "amended complaint" asserting 
new causes of action against both defendant Mountain Fuel and 
the plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation. (R. 11:80-86). In 
the aforesaid motion, the intervenors stated that the reason 
for the motion was that the intervenors had "discovered that 
they have some claims independent of the plaintiff and a 
cross-claim against the plaintiff [Salt Lake City Corporation] 
-20-
and that they assert additional claims against the defendant 
[Mountain Fuel] . . • ." (R. 11:87). 
31. District Judge Durham conditionally granted the 
interveners' motion to file an amended complaint. (R. 11:89, 
149-50). Judge Durham only granted the intervenors' 
conditional leave to amend because the court also granted 
Mountain Fuel's motion for summary judgment against Salt Lake 
City Corporation and the intervenors (LeMel and the Ingersolls) 
on Salt Lake City Corporation's complaint, which complaint 
originally had been adopted by the intervenors as their own. 
(R. 11:149). 
32. On or about April 30, 1979, the intervenors in 
the Salt Lakes City Case (LeMel and the Ingersolls) filed their 
amended complaint, asserting causes of action against Mountain 
Fuel and Salt Lake City Corporation. (R. 11:151-157). The 
amended complaint filed by the intervenors in the Salt Lake 
City Case expressly identifies the disputed property as 
including the same Vacated Street Property at issue in this 
case (i.e., First South Street west of 1100 West and that 
portion of Glendale Street north of 100 South Street and First 
South Street between 10th and 11th West). (R. 11:151-157). 
33. Paragraph 4 of the prayer for relief in the 
intervenors' amended complaint in the Salt Lake City Case seeks 
"judgment against the defendant [i.e., Mountain Fuel] enforcing 
the promises of the Defendant and estopping Defendant from 
claiming any right, title or interest in the subject matter 
real property." (R. 11:156). 
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34. On or about May 24, 1979, Salt Lake City 
Corporation filed an amended complaint in the Salt Lake City 
Case adding LeMel Corporation and an entity named Latin 
American Assembly of God, Inc. as co-defendants with Mountain 
Fuel because it had become apparent to Salt Lake City 
Corporation that those additional defendants also claimed an 
interest in the Vacated Street Property at issue in the Salt 
Lake City Case. (R. 11:158-72). 
35. On or about October 11, 1979, in the Salt Lake 
City Case, Mountain Fuel filed an "Answer to Interveners' 
Amended Complaint", asserting numerous defenses. (R. 
11:184-192). 
36. In the amended complaint filed by LeMel and the 
Ingersolls in the Salt Lake City Case, LeMel and the Ingersolls 
asserted numerous causes of action expressing their 
dissatisfaction with Mountain Fuel's assertion of control over 
the Vacated Street Property at issue in that case. For 
example, at paragraph 30 of their amended complaint in the Salt 
Lake City Case, LeMel and the Ingersolls claimed that Mountain 
Fuel was "using the subject matter property as if it were the 
owner and is denying the public the use of said streets and is 
preventing access to the Brewery Mall, causing damage to the 
intervenors in an amount to be determined." (R. 11:84). 
37. On or about August 11, 1982, in the Salt Lake 
City Case, Mountain Fuel filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Intervenors, Memorandum and Notice of Hearing." (R. 
11:227-240). 
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38. The exhibits attached to Mountain Fuel's motion 
for summary judgment against the Ingersolls in the Salt Lake 
City Case included the same Quit-Claim deed at issue in this 
case (attached to this Brief as Addendum Exhibit F) and the 
same June 3, 1982 Trustee's Deed from NACM Intermountain to 
General Brewing Company at issue in this case (attached to this 
Brief as Addendum Exhibit H). Compare R. 1:41 with R. 11:231 
and compare R. 1:54 with R. 11:235. 
39. In Mountain Fuel's motion for summary judgment 
against the Ingersolls in the Salt Lake City Case, Mountain 
Fuel stated: 
This motion is based upon (i) the pleadings (ii) 
upon a certified copy of a quitclaim deed which 
conveyed to intervenor LeMel Corporation the 
interest of intervenors Melvin E. Ingersoll, 
Marian Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll, and Evelyn 
E. Ingersoll in the property which is the subject 
matter of their amended complaint (the "Brewery 
Property") and (iii) a certified copy of the 
Trustee's Deed from N.A.C.M. Intermountain, 
Trustee in Bankruptcy for LeMel Corporation 
conveying the Brewery Property to a third party, 
General Brewing Company. Such pleadings and 
documents establish as a matter of law that 
intervenors no longer hold title to the Brewery 
Property, that their amended complaint fails to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
and that the intervenors have no standing to 
prosecute their lawsuit. 
During the long, drawn out course of litigation 
affecting portions of First South Street in Salt 
Lake City, intervenors have attempted to have the 
vacating ordinances affecting such portions of 
streets set aside, as has cross-defendant, Salt 
Lake City. The intervenors no longer have any 
interest in the property allegedly affected by 
such vacations nor do the intervenors have any 
interest in a portion of First South Street which 
reverted to intervenors as former adjoining land 
owners upon such vocation [sic]. Intervenors 
amended complaint is based on allegations that 
_oo 
their interest in the Brewery Property was 
damaged by the actions of defendant and 
cross-defendant. "It is essential, however, to 
enable one to maintain an action for damages for 
injury to realty, that he shall have some right, 
title, interest or estate therein.ff [Citations 
omitted]. No intervenor has such interest, and 
as a matter of law, the motion for summary 
judgment against intervenors should be granted. 
(R. 11:228-229). 
40. The Certificate of Service attached to Mountain 
Fuel's motion for summary judgment against the intervenors in 
the Salt Lake City Case makes clear that copies of the motion 
and of the notice of hearing were mailed to the Ingersolls 
personally and to counsel for LeMel Corporation's bankruptcy 
trustee. (R. 11:229-230). 
41. Mountain Fuel's motion for summary judgment 
against the Ingersolls in the Salt Lake City Case was heard by 
the Honorable Philip R. Fischler, August 31, 1982, and was 
granted. (R. 11:241). Coincidentally, it was Judge Fischler 
who heard and decided Interstate's objection to the Ingersolls' 
motion to intervene in this case on May 5, 1986. 
(R. 1:194-221). Without being reminded by counsel in this 
case, Judge Fischler remembered the Salt Lake City Case on his 
own at the May 5, 1986 hearing in this case. (R. 1:197). 
42. Judge Fischler entered an order on or about 
September 10, 1982 in the Salt Lake City Case stating that 
neither the Ingersolls nor LeMel Corporation appeared at the 
hearing on Mountain Fuel's motion for summary judgment against 
them. Judge Fischler stated that the court considered the 
matters on file and was of the opinion that the motion for 
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summary judgment by Mountain Fuel should be granted in favor of 
Mountain Fuel against the Ingersolls on the Ingersolls' amended 
complaint and said amended complaint was "dismissed with 
prejudice on the merits." (R. 11:242-244). 
43. The Ingersolls never filed a notice of appeal 
from the final "Judgment" entered against them on or about 
September 10, 1982 by Judge Fischler in the Salt Lake City 
Case. (R. 11:242). 
44. On or about November 8, 1982, Mountain Fuel went 
to trial against Salt Lake City Corporation in the Salt Lake 
City Case. Mountain Fuel won the trial and judgment was 
entered in favor of Mountain Fuel against Salt Lake City 
Corporation. No appeal was taken. (R. 11:310-311). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST MR. PATTERSON IS PROPER 
The Supreme Court should affirm the lower court's 
order granting Interstate's motion for summary judgment against 
Mr. Patterson. Affirmance is particularly in order in this 
case because Mr. Patterson did not file any affidavits or even 
a memorandum in opposition to Interstate's Motion in the lower 
court. Mr. Patterson claims an interest in Vacated Street 
Property pursuant to the July 27, 1979 Quit-Claim deed which is 
attached to this Brief as Addendum Exhibit J. The lower Court 
properly held as a matter of law that Mr. Patterson has no 
right, title or interest in the Vacated Street Property because 
the grantor named in the Quit-Claim deed -- LeMel Corporation 
-- had no right, title or interest in the Vacated Street 
Property at the time LeMel Corporation purportedly conveyed the 
deed to Mr. Patterson. 
In the alternative to contending that LeMel 
Corporation had no interest, Interstate contends that even if 
LeMel Corporation had some interest in the Vacated Street 
Property, the interest, if any, of LeMel Corporation was 
subordinate to the security interest of the trustee and 
beneficiary named in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed. The July 6, 
1977 Trust Deed was given by LeMel Corporation and the 
Ingersolls to secure a $1.8 million debt incurred by them to 
purchase the Brewery Property from General Brewing Company. A 
copy of the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed is attached to this Brief 
as Addendum Exhibit A. Interstate should win even if a trust 
deed given to secure a debt only creates a lien against the 
trust property. 
It is undisputed that LeMel Corporation and the 
Ingersolls defaulted on the $1.8 million debt secured by the 
July 6, 1977 Trust Deed. It is further undisputed that LeMel 
Corporation filed for bankruptcy and that the Ingersolls 
conveyed their interest in the trust property to LeMel 
Corporation. See Addendum Exhibit F. It is also undisputed 
that the court-appointed trustee in the LeMel bankruptcy 
proceeding, NACM Intermountain, conveyed the Brewery Property 
and the Vacated Street Property (with U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
approval) by Special Warranty Deed back to the unpaid seller of 
the property -- General Brewing Company (i.e., the beneficiary 
named in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed). It is further 
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undisputed that General Brewing Company thereafter conveyed the 
Brewery Property and the Vacated Street Property to Interstate 
pursuant to the Special Warranty Deed attached to this Brief as 
Addendum Exhibit I. 
This court should rule as a matter of law that even 
when the undisputed evidence is viewed in a light most 
favorable to Mr. Patterson (and the Ingersolls), that Mr. 
Patterson (and the Ingersolls) lost whatever interest they 
might have had in the Vacated Street Property when LeMel 
Corporation and the Ingersolls defaulted on their $1.8 million 
debt to General Brewing Company. LeMel's successor, Mr. 
Patterson, and the Ingersolls are simply not entitled to reap a 
windfall on the Vacated Street Property after they defaulted on 
their $1.8 million loan to Interstate's predecessor-in-
interest, General Brewing Company. 
B. THE INGERSOLLS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERVENE 
This court should also affirm the lower court order 
denying the Ingersolls' motion to intervene. Under Rule 24 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Interstate recognizes that 
generally it would be an abuse of discretion for a lower court 
to prevent a party from intervening in a quiet title case when 
that party asserted an ownership interest in the real property 
at issue in this case. In this case, however, the Ingersolls 
were not entitled to intervene as a matter of right or as a 
matter of permission. The Ingersolls have already had their 
day in court, so intervention is not appropriate. Interstate 
objected to the Ingersolls' motion to intervene on the grounds 
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that their proposed complaint in intervention was barred as a 
matter of law under the doctrine of res judicata and/or 
collateral estoppel. Specifically, Interstate submitted into 
the record in this case the official court file from the Salt 
Lake City Case described above in Undisputed Fact Nos. 27-44. 
(R. 1:198). On the merits, the Ingersolls should lose for the 
same reasons Mr. Patterson lost. 
The real property at issue in the Salt Lake City Case 
included the same Vacated Street Property at issue in this 
case. Adverse litigants in the Salt Lake City Case included 
the Ingersolls, on the one hand, and Mountain Fuel, on the 
other. Interstate is Mountain Fuel's privie for purposes of 
this litigation because Interstate and Mountain Fuel are sister 
companies (R. 1:198) and Interstate has conveyed its interest 
in the Vacated Street Property to Mountain Fuel subsequent to 
the initiation this lawsuit. (R. 1:94). In the Salt Lake City 
Case, Mountain Fuel moved for summary judgment against the 
Ingersolls on the theory that the Ingersolls no longer had a 
right to participate in that case since they no longer had any 
interest in either the Brewery Property or the Vacated Street 
Property. The lower Court in the Salt Lake City Case granted 
Mountain Fuel's motion for summary judgment on the foregoing 
theory and the Ingersolls did not appeal from that final order. 
The doctrine of res judicata (i.e., claim preclusion) 
bars the Ingersolls' proposed complaint in intervention because 
the causes of action the Ingersolls want to assert in 
intervention in this case should have been raised, if at all, 
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in the Salt Lake City Case. In the alternative, the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel (i.e., issue preclusion) bars the 
Ingersolls' proposed complaint in intervention because the 
Ingersolls are estopped from relitigating the property 
ownership issue specifically adjudicated in the Salt Lake City 
Case adverse to the Ingersolls (i.e., the issue determined in 
the Salt Lake City Case that the Ingersolls no longer have any 
right, title or interest in the Brewery Property or the Vacated 
Street Property). (R. 11:227-230; 11:242-244). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED INTERSTATEyS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PATTERSON 
A. MR. PATTERSON ACQUIRED NO INTEREST IN THE VACATED 
STREET PROPERTY UNDER THE MARCH 11, 1982 QUIT-CLAIM 
DEED FROM LeMEL CORPORATION BECAUSE LeMEL CORPORATION 
HAD NO INTEREST IN THE VACATED STREET PROPERTY 
The issue in this case, as between Interstate and Mr. 
Patterson, is who owns a certain parcel of land near 1100 West 
and 100 South in Salt Lake City. The disputed property is 
described herein as the Vacated Street Property. The Vacated 
Street Property is described more particularly in the March 11, 
1982 Quit-Claim Deed under which Mr. Patterson claims an 
interest. See Addendum Exhibit J. The Vacated Street Property 
is also described more particularly as parcels Nos. 8 and 9 in 
the February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed under which 
Interstate claims an interest. See Addendum Exhibit I. 
Although the property descriptions in Mr. Patterson's March 11, 
1982 Quit-Claim Deed and in Interstate?s February 14, 1984 
-29-
Special Warranty Deed are different, it is undisputed that the 
property descriptions contained in those two deeds pertain to 
the exact same piece of land. See Affidavit of Raymond L. 
Griffith at H 4. (R. 1:70-71). 
In Brigham Truck & Implement Company v. Fridal, 71 
Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (S.Ct. Nov. 27, 1987), the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed a 1984 holding that, when a motion for summary 
judgment is filed, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided for in the rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial." (citation omitted). In this case, Mr. Patterson and 
the Ingersolls ignored that rule and submitted no affidavits or 
memoranda in opposition to Interstate's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Accordingly, Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls should 
not be allowed to claim on appeal that there is a disputed 
issue of fact. 
The Vacated Street Property is immediately adjacent to 
a much larger parcel of land that has been historically used as 
a beer brewery. The old beer brewery property is referred to 
herein as the Brewery Property. It was originally owned by 
General Brewing Company. The Brewery Property is that real 
property more particularly described as parcels Nos. 1 through 
7 in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed. See Addendum Exhibit A. The 
first seven parcels described in the February 14, 1984 Special 
Warranty Deed (see Addendum Exhibit I) (under which Interstate 
claims an interest) are the same seven parcels described in the 
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July 6, 1977 Trust Deed. Whereas the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed 
only expressly describes the Brewery Property (i.e. Parcel Nos. 
1-7), the February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed expressly 
describes both the Brewery Property (parcels Nos. 1-7) and the 
Vacated Street Property (parcels Nos. 8-9). Compare Addendum 
Exhibits A and I. 
Assuming for purposes of this Appeal that the March 
11, 1982 Quit-claim Deed (Addendum Exhibit J) from LeMel 
Corporation to Mr. Patterson was properly executed, 
acknowledged, and delivered, it had "the effect of a conveyance 
of all right, title, interest and estate of the grantor in and 
to the premises therein described and all rights, privileges 
and appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date of such 
conveyance." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13 (1953, as amended). 
However, it is well settled that the grantor of a quit-claim 
deed makes no warranty to the grantee that the grantor 
necessarily has any interest in the property conveyed. That 
is, a conveyance by a quit-claim deed gives only the grantor's 
interest, if any, and implies nothing more. See Johnson v. 
Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 312 (Utah 1983); Wallace v. Build Inc., 
16 Utah 2d 401, 405, 402 P.2d 699, 701 (1965); Nix v. Tooele 
County, 101 Utah 84, 87, 118 P.2d 376, 377 (1941). It 
follows, therefore, that a grantee under a quit-claim deed 
acquires no right, title or interest from his grantor in the 
property described in the quit-claim deed if the grantor has no 
right, title or interest in said property at the time of the 
conveyance. 
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There is no magic in recording a quit-claim deed 
purporting to convey something in which the purported grantor 
had no interest. Cf., Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 
1979) (holding that a grantor may not effectively reserve a 
right in real property to himself unless the grantor already 
possesses the right purportedly reserved); Peay v. B&N Inc., 
24 Utah 2d 86, 89, 465 P.2d 1018, 1020 (1970) (holding that 
recordation of a certain real estate sales contract "in no 
sense encumbered the property" because at the time of the 
recording the "seller" described in the real estate contract 
did not have title to the property described in the contract). 
It is undisputed that the March 11, 1982 Quit-Claim 
Deed under which Mr. Patterson claims an interest was recorded 
prior in time to the February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed 
under which Interstate claims an interest. The issue raised by 
Interstate1s Motion is not, therefore, whether Interstate had 
constructive notice of Mr. Patterson's Quit-Claim Deed at the 
time Interstate acquired title to the Vacated Street Property. 
Rather, the issue raised by Interstatefs Motion is whether 
LeMel Corporation had any right, title or interest whatsoever 
in the Vacated Street Property on July 27, 1979 -- the date 
LeMel Corporation purportedly executed the March 11, 1982 
Quit-Claim Deed in favor of Mr. Patterson. In the alternative, 
the issue is whether LeMelfs interest, if any, in the Vacated 
Street Property was at least subordinate to the interest in the 
Vacated Street Property held by trustee and the beneficiary 
named in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed. 
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Based on the undisputed facts, the lower court ruled 
as a matter of law that LeMel Corporation did not have any 
right, title or interest in the Vacated Street Property as of 
July 27, 1979. The lower court so held because LeMel 
Corporation (along with the four Ingersolls, who were 
principals in LeMel Corporation) had--pursuant to the July 6, 
1977 Trust Deed (Addendum Exhibit A) -- previously conveyed to 
trustee Backman Abstract & Title Company, for the benefit of 
General Brewing Company, all of their right, title and interest 
in the property to secure a $1.8 million note which they had 
signed in favor of General Brewing Company. When Salt Lake 
City thereafter abandoned the Vacated Street Property --
effective November 14, 1977 pursuant to an Ordinance (Addendum 
Exhibit B) -- the city's street easement in said street 
property automatically reverted as a matter of law up to the 
middle of the streets to the adjoining property holders. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 27-12-101 (1953, as amended) ("A transfer of 
land bounded by a public highway on a right-of-way for which 
the public has only an easement passes the title of the person 
whose estate is transferred to the middle of the highway.") 
The Vacated Street Property at issue in this case thus 
automatically reverted to Backman Abstract and Title, the 
trustee under the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed, as additional 
security for the trustors' debt to the beneficiary. 
Mr. Patterson maintains that when Salt Lake City 
abandoned the Vacated Street Property effective November 14, 
1977, that said property somehow reverted to the trustors LeMel 
Corporation and the four Ingersolls (i.e., rather than to the 
trustee Backman Abstract and Title). Mr. Patterson (and the 
Ingersolls) even go so far as to claim that the lien created by 
the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed did not attach to the Vacated 
Street Property to secure the debt. However, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-20 expressly provides that after-acquired title 
automatically inures to the benefit of the trustee under a 
trust deed as security for the debt owed to the beneficiary and 
does not to inure to the benefit of the trustors. Section 
57-1-20 provides: 
Transfers in trust of real property may be made 
to secure the performance of an obligation of the 
trustor or any other person named in the trust 
deed to a beneficiary. All right, title, 
interest and claim in and to the trust property 
acquired by the trustor, or his successors in 
interest, subsequent to the execution of the 
trust deed, shall inure to the trustee as 
security for the obligation or obligations for 
which the trust property is conveyed in like 
manner as if acquired before execution of the 
trust deed. 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the lower court ruled as a matter 
of law that, effective November 14, 1977 (i.e., 30 days after 
first publication on October 15, 1977 of the Ordinance attached 
as Addendum Exhibit B), the Vacated Street Property 
automatically inured to the benefit of the trustee, Backman 
Abstract & Title Company, as security for the trustors' debt to 
General Brewing Company, the beneficiary. The Vacated Street 
Property thereafter inured to Richard L. Blanck as security for 
the debt when he was designated the substituted trustee on or 
about August 31, 1979 by General Brewing Company, the 
beneficiary. (See Addendum Exhibit C). 
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According to the September 7, 1979 and the October 22, 
1979 Notice of Default documents recorded by Mr. Blanck (see 
Addendum Exhibits D and E), LeMel Corporation and the four 
Ingersoll individuals eventually defaulted on the $1.8 million 
note which they had signed to buy the Brewery Property from 
General Brewing Company and which note was secured by the July 
6, 1977 Trust Deed. Thereafter, with the debt to General 
Brewing Company still unsatisfied, LeMel Corporation filed a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition with the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (Case No. 80-00755). 
The Ingersolls quit-claimed whatever interest they had in the 
trust property to LeMel Corporation (See Addendum Exhibit F). 
NACM Intermountain, Inc. became LeMel Corporation's 
duly-appointed trustee in bankruptcy. As a secured creditor in 
the bankruptcy proceeding (i.e., for the $1.8 million Brewery 
Property loan secured by the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed), General 
Brewing Company was able to enter into an agreement with the 
bankruptcy estate trustee, NACM Intermountain, whereby NACM 
conveyed the property back to General Brewing Company. NACM, 
as LeMelvs trustee in bankruptcy, sought and obtained 
Bankruptcy Court approval to expressly convey both the Brewery 
Property and the Vacated Street Property to General Brewing 
Company. (See Addendum Exhibit G). The Vacated Street 
Property was conveyed to General Brewing Company by NACM 
Intermountain. (See Parcels Nos. 8 and 9 described in Addendum 
Exhibit H). 
General Brewing Company thereafter conveyed the 
Brewery Property and the Vacated Street Property to Interstate 
by means of the February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed. 
(Addendum Exhibit I). As established in the Affidavit of 
Raymond L. Griffith at % 4, IL 1:71, the Vacated Street 
Property described as Parcels Nos- 8 and 9 in Interstatefs 
February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed is the exact same 
Vacated Street Property described in Mr. Patterson1s March 11, 
1982 Quit-Claim Deed. 
Although the foregoing facts may seem at first blush 
to be somewhat complicated, none of them are disputed. 
Moreover, at its core, the legal issue is this case is very 
straightforward. Specifically, the key issue is whether LeMel 
Corporation had any interest whatsoever in the Vacated Street 
Property as of July 27, 1979 when LeMel Corporation purportedly 
executed the March 11, 1982 Quit-Claim Deed in favor of Mr. 
Patterson. In the alternative, the issue is whether LeMelfs 
interest in the Vacated Street Property, if any, was 
subordinate to that of the interest of the trustee and 
beneficiary named in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed. The lower 
court properly held against Mr. Patterson because LeMel gave 
nothing to Mr. Patterson or at least LeMel gave Mr. Patterson 
no title superior to LeMelfs secured creditor under the Trust 
Deed. (R. 1:150). 
B. INTERSTATE WINS EVEN IT A TKDST DEED DOES NOT CONVEY TITLE 
BUT ONLY CREATES A LIEN 
Mr. Patterson (and the Ingersolls) seem to think that 
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it matters in this case whether Utah is a so-called f,lien 
state" or a so-called "title state." See Appellant's Brief at 
10-11, wherein they cite Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 
P.2d 118 (1948) for the proposition that a trustee under a 
trust deed holds only a lien or security interest in the 
property by reason of the trust deed. Mr. Patterson and the 
Ingersolls claim that the trustee named in the July 6, 1977 
Trust Deed is not the real "owner" of the Brewery Property so 
as to vest ownership of the Vacated Street Property in the 
trustee under the trust deed. 
Interstate recognizes that Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-8 
(1953, as amended) states: "A mortgage of real property shall 
not be deemed a conveyance, whatever its terms, so as to enable 
the owner of the mortgage to recover possession of the real 
property without a foreclosure and sale." See generally Brief 
submitted by Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls at 10-11. A 
trust deed is different from a mortgage under Utah law. 
However, for purposes of this appeal, the Supreme Court does 
not need to decide whether a trust deed conveys "title" to a 
trustee, or whether the trustee merely acquires a "lien" 
against the property as security for the debt referenced in the 
trust deed. 
Interstate argued in the lower court that it is 
entitled to summary judgment against Mr. Patterson even if Utah 
is a lien state. (R. 1:214). The rationale for Interstatefs 
argument is that LeMel (Mr. Patterson's grantor) and the 
Ingersolls gave General Brewing Company a trust deed to secure 
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a $1.8 million debt. Thereafter, LeMel Corporation and the 
Ingersolls defaulted on the debt. LeMel Corporation filed for 
bankruptcy and the four Ingersolls conveyed by quit claim deed 
whatever interest they had in the trust property to LeMel. 
Thereafter, LeMel's bankruptcy trustee, NACM Intermountain, 
conveyed the property back to the unpaid beneficiary named in 
the trust deed. After General Brewing Company got the Brewery 
Property and the Vacated Street Property back from the 
bankruptcy trustee, General Brewing Company proceded to resell 
the property to Interstate. As such, Interstate is the direct 
successor in interest to General Brewing Company. Since Mr. 
Patterson (and the Ingersolls) concede that they at least gave 
a lien to the trustee to secure their $1.8 million debt to 
General Brewing Company, they should not now be heard to 
complain that the lien was foreclosed for the benefit of their 
unpaid seller when they defaulted on the debt. 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon decided a case 
remarkably similar to this case in Umpqua Savings & Loan Ass'n. 
v. Security Bank of Coos County, 71 Or. App. 555, 693 P.2d 57 
(1984) (hereinafter Umpqua). Umpqua was a declaratory 
judgment action to determine the relative priority of a trust 
deed held by a savings and loan vis-a-vis a prior-recorded 
trust deed held by a bank. Exactly like this case, the 
property at issue in the Umpqua was certain vacated municipal 
street property which had reverted to the abutting property 
owners (under an Oregon statute substantially similar to Utah's 
statute). In Umpqua, a property owner who owned real property 
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on both sides of a certain street named "Edwards Avenue" gave a 
trust deed to the bank to secure a loan of $150,000. The trust 
deed described the real property on both sides of Edwards 
Avenue "together with all the improvements now or hereafter 
erected and all easements, rights, appurtenances, . . . ." 693 
P.2d at 58. As in this case, the trust deed given to the bank 
did not include a metes and bounds description of Edwards 
Avenue because Edwards Avenue was a public street at the time 
the property owner borrowed the money and conveyed the trust 
deed. Thereafter, as in this case, the city enacted an 
ordinance vacating Edwards Avenue, with the effect that it 
reverted to the property owner who undeniably owned land on 
both sides of Edwards Avenue. 
Subsequent to the vacation of Edwards Avenue, the 
property owner in Umpqua borrowed an additional $46,000 from a 
different lending institution -- the savings and loan --to 
build a single family residence on the vacated Edwards Avenue. 
The trust deed given to the savings and loan expressly 
described the Edwards Avenue street property. The savings and 
loan instituted Umpqua as a declaratory judgment action when 
there was a default on the $46,000 loan. As between the bank 
and the savings and loan, the bank won. The Court of Appeals 
of Oregon held in favor of the bank even though the bank's 
prior-recorded trust deed did not expressly describe Edwards 
Avenue, whereas the savings & loan's later trust deed did 
expressly describe Edwards Avenue. The Court in the Umpqua 
explained: 
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Defendant's [i.e., the bank's] trust deed also 
covered "all * * * rights" of the described real 
property that bordered on the north and south 
lines of Edwards Avenue. When defendant [i.e., 
the bank] first took and recorded its trust deed 
the Luecks and Lairds [i.e., the "property owner" 
described above] owned that adjacent real 
property. Their "right" under ORS 271.140 to 
title in the street if it were vacated was one of 
the "rights" that their trust deed granted to 
defendant. Before plaintiff [i.e., the savings 
and loan] had taken or recorded its trust deed, 
the city had vacated the street, and the lien of 
defendant's [i.e., the bank's] trust deed had 
attached to and covered the title to vacated 
Edwards Avenue. 
693 P.2d at 59 (citation omitted). Likewise, in this case the 
July 6, 1977 Trust Deed given by LeMel Corporation and the 
Ingersolls to secure their $1.8 million debt to General Brewing 
Company conveyed to the trustee all of the Brewery Property, 
"TOGETHER WITH all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon 
and all water rights, rights-of-way, easements, rents, issues, 
profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and 
appurtenances thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with 
said property, or any part thereof." See Addendum Exhibit A to 
this Brief; R. 1:19. Thus, even if Utah is a "lien state" with 
respect to trust deeds, this court should rule as a matter of 
law that the lien created by LeMel Corporation and the 
Ingersolls extended to the Vacated Street Property once that 
property inured to the benefit of the Brewery Property as a 
"privilege" thereof. 
Although the lower court judgment in favor of 
Interstate should be affirmed regardless of whether Utah is a 
lien state or a title state, Interstate notes that there is 
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substantial reason to believe that Utah is a title state with 
respect to trust deeds, even though Utah is a lien state with 
respect to mortgages. Utah Code. Ann. § 57-1-19(4) (1953, as 
amended) defines a "trustee" under a trust deed as "a person to 
whom title to real property is conveyed by trust deed, or his 
successor in interest." Section 57-1-19(5) defines "real 
property" expansively as meaning "any estate or interest in 
land, including all buildings, fixtures and improvements 
thereon and all water rights, rights-of-way, easements, rents, 
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges 
and appurtenances thereunto belonging, used or enjoyed with 
said land, or any part thereof." Furthermore, the term "trust 
property" is defined as meaning "the real property conveyed by 
the trust deed." Reading those foregoing definitional statutes 
in conjunction with § 57-1-20 (quoted verbatim above) there is 
a strong reason to conclude that the Legislature intended for 
trust deeds to convey title to the trustee even though a 
mortgage only creates a lien in favor of the mortgagee. 
Commentators have recognized the distinction between 
mortgages and trust deeds. See BYU Summary of Utah Real 
Property Law, § 9.44 (1978) ("With a mortgage, title remains 
with the mortgagor until the foreclosure sale at which time it 
passes from the mortgagor to the purchaser. In the deed of 
trust, title passes to the trustee who holds it until 
satisfaction or default. Upon foreclosure sale it passes from 
trustee to purchaser.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
See also Shores v. Rabon, 251 N.C. 790, 112 S.E.2d 556 (1960) 
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stating that the trustee under a deed of trust "holds the legal 
title"). 
For the foregoing reasons, Interstate seeks affirmance 
of the summary judgment holding that Mr. Patterson acquired no 
right, title or interest in the Vacated Street Property by 
virtue of the March 11, 1982 Quit-Claim Deed. 
C. INTERSTATE IS ALSO ENTITLED TO AFFIRMANCE OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON MR. PATTERSON'S THIRD, FOURTH AND FIFTH 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
Based on the undisputed facts, the lower court also 
granted summary judgment in favor of Interstate and against Mr. 
Patterson with respect to the third, fourth and fifth 
affirmative defenses raised in Mr. Patterson's answer. 
With regard to Mr. Patterson's third defense, Mr. 
Patterson claims that the March 11, 1982 Quit-Claim Deed only 
gave him a one-fifth interest in the real property described 
therein. See Mr. Patterson's Answer at page 2. (R. 1:4-5). 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Patterson did not even get 
a one-fifth interest. Furthermore, the March 11, 1982 
Quit-Claim Deed makes no such qualification upon the extent of 
the interest conveyed. See Addendum Exhibit J. Therefore, the 
lower court ruled as a matter of law under Utah Code Ann. § 
57-1-13 (1953, as amended) that LeMel Corporation conveyed all 
of its interest, if any. (R. 1:102, 151). It is well settled 
that construction of deeds is a question of law for the Court 
in the absence of ambiguity and that where a deed is plain and 
unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible to vary its 
terms. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979). 
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The lower court also ruled as a matter of law against 
Mr. Patterson on his fourth and fifth affirmative defenses, 
which defenses claimed that the Ingersolls needed to be parties 
to this case. Since the Ingersolls tried to intervene and were 
not allowed to intervene, the next section of this Brief will 
explain why the Ingersolls are not necessary parties. (R. 
1:102, 151). 
II. 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
INGERSOLLS1 MOTION TO INTERVENE 
The lower court denied the Ingersolls' motion to 
intervene because the Ingersolls had already had their day in 
court in the Salt Lake City Case. Certainly a lower court does 
not abuse its discretion by preventing a party from intervening 
in a case if the party's proposed complaint in intervention is 
barred by principles of res judicata and/or collateral 
estoppel. The Ingersolls claim in their Brief (at page 13) 
that they somehow "were unfairly taken by surprise at the 
hearing on the motion for permission to intervene by 
plaintiff's [i.e. Interstate's] argument that their right to 
intervene might be affected by the holding in another case 
involving these parties." The Ingersolls claim of "surprise" 
is disingenuous at best. In fact, it was Interstate who was 
surprised by the Ingersolls eleventh hour motion to intervene 
in the case. On or about April 25, 1986, counsel for 
Interstate served a notice of hearing on counsel for Mr. 
Patterson that Interstate's motion for summary judgment against 
Mr. Patterson would be heard May 5, 1986 before the Honorable 
Philip R. Fischler. (R. 1:110-111). Since the Ingersolls were 
not a party to the action, they were not served with a copy of 
the notice of hearing. Nonetheless, somehow the Ingersolls 
learned of the scheduled hearing. Two days before that 
hearing, on or about May 3, 1986, counsel for the Ingersolls 
served the Ingersolls' "Motion for Permission to File Complaint 
in Intervention and Notice of Hearing" on Mr. Patterson's 
former counsel and on counsel for Interstate. (R. 1:112-115). 
At the Ingersolls' request, their motion to intervene was heard 
at the same time as Interstate's motion for summary judgment. 
(R. 1:115; 1:205). 
The Ingersolls were represented at the hearing on 
their motion to intervene personally and through counsel. The 
Ingersolls should have been prepared to meet the obvious 
objection that they already had been heard and had already lost 
on the merits in the Salt Lake City Case. Under the foregoing 
circumstances, it is preposterous for the Ingersolls to claim 
on appeal that they were somehow prejudiced or surprised that 
Interstate, a sister company of Mountain Fuel, would raise the 
defense that the Ingersolls had already had their day in court 
regarding the Vacated Street Property. Even if the lower court 
erred in granting Mountain Fuel's motion for summary judgment 
against the Ingersolls in the Salt Lake City Case (which, of 
course, is not conceded), said Judgment is binding because the 
Ingersolls did not take an appeal from that final Judgment "on 
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the merits" entered against them in the Salt Lake City Case. 
(R. 11:242). 
The Ingersolls' claim of surprise is further undercut 
by their own inattention to the matter subsequent to the 
hearing May 5, 1986 before Judge Fischler. At the hearing, 
counsel for the Ingersolls claimed that he lacked knowledge of 
the Salt Lake City Case and even proposed to submit a post-
hearing memorandum on the matter. (R. 1:207). At the end of 
the hearing, Judge Fischler took the matter under advisement. 
(R. 1:221). Judge Fischler did not enter his minute order 
until more than two months later, on or about July 28, 1986. 
(R. 1:144). At no time between the May 5, 1986 hearing and the 
July 28, 1986 minute entry did the Ingersolls submit (or ask 
permission to submit) any post-hearing supplemental memorandum 
(or affidavits) addressing the res judicata and collateral 
estoppel arguments raised by Interstate. 
As the terms are generally used, res judicata refers 
to claim preclusion, whereas collateral estoppel refers to 
issue preclusion. The reason Interstate argued both collateral 
estoppel and res judicata below, and continues to argue both 
theories on appeal, is that both doctrines apply to support the 
lower court's refusal to allow the Ingersolls to intervene. 
In Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 
(Utah 1983) Justice Stewart, writing for a unanimous court, 
explained the distinction and relationship between res judicata 
and collateral estoppel as follows: 
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The doctrine of res judicata is two branches with 
somewhat different rules governing each branch, 
although both branches basically serve the 
important judicial policy, among others, of 
preventing issues once litigated from being 
relitigated. [Citation omitted]. One branch, 
claim preclusion, bars the relitigation by the 
parties or their privies of a claim for relief 
that was once litigated on the merits and 
resulted in a final judgment between the same 
parties or their privies. [Citations omitted]. 
The same rule also prevents relitigation of 
claims that could and should have been litigated 
in the prior action but were not. [Citations 
omitted]. 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, 
prevents the relitigation of issues that have 
been once litigated and determined in another 
action even though the claims for relief in the 
two actions may be different. [Citations omitted] 
669 P.2d at 874-75 (citations omitted). In Searle Bros, v. 
Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978), the Supreme Court 
said: "The legal definition of a person in privity with 
another, is a person so identified in interest with another 
that he represents the same legal rights. This includes a 
mutual or successive relationship to rights in real property." 
The doctrine of res judicata bars the Ingersolls' 
proposed complaint in intervention because the causes of action 
asserted in the Ingersolls' proposed complaint in intervention 
in this case are causes of action which "could and should have 
been litigated" in the Salt Lake City Case, "but were not." 
669 P.2d at 875. Interstate concedes that the Ingersolls? 
causes of action in the Salt Lake City Case were different from 
the specific causes of action in the Ingersolls' proposed 
complaint in intervention in this case. However, since the 
ownership of the Vacated Street Property was the central issue 
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in the Salt Lake City Case, this Court should apply the 
doctrine of res judicata to bar the Ingersolls' proposed 
complaint in intervention in this case. 
At the very least, the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
precludes the Ingersolls from relitigating the issue of their 
ownership interest, if any, in the Vacated Street Property, 
The motion for summary judgment filed by Interstatefs sister 
company, Mountain Fuel, in the Salt Lake City Case brought into 
issue the very question of whether the Ingersolls had any 
right, title or interest in the Vacated Street Property. 
Summary judgment was entered against the Ingersolls in the Salt 
Lake City Case in favor of Mountain Fuel on the ownership issue 
and no appeal was taken from that adverse ruling. The 
Ingersolls are estopped from relitigating the issue of their 
ownership previously decided against them in the Salt Lake City 
Case. Even if the ruling against the Ingersolls in the Salt 
Lake City Case was erroneous, it became permanently binding on 
the Ingersolls by their voluntary election not to appeal from 
that ruling. 
Interstate is Mountain Fuel's "privie" for purposes of 
this case because the two companies are affiliates and because 
Mountain Fuel is Interstatefs successor to the Brewery Property 
and the Vacated Street Property. (R. 1:94). 
The Ingersolls insist that at the very least they 
should have been allowed to intervene in this case to litigate 
their adverse possession claims. See Mr. Patterson and the 
Ingersolls1 Brief at 12. However, as a matter of law, the 
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Ingersolls are unable to plead a prima facie adverse possession 
claim. Under the Utah adverse possession statutes, the 
Ingersolls would have to show that they have been adversely 
possessing the Vacated Street Property continuously for seven 
years immediately prior to May 5, 1986, the date of the hearing 
on their proposed complaint in intervention. The Ingersolls 
allege in their proposed complaint in intervention that they 
have been adversely possessing the Vacated Street Property 
"from and after October of 1977." (R. 1:122). However, as a 
matter of law, the Ingersolls could not have been occupying the 
Vacated Street Property adverse to the interests of Interstate 
(or its sister company and successor in interest, Mountain 
Fuel) for that period of time. 
Based on the pleadings filed by the Ingersolls in the 
Salt Lake City Case, the Court can rule as a matter of law that 
the Ingersolls cannot satisfy the seven year test. For 
example, in the amended complaint filed by the Ingersolls on or 
about April 30, 1979 in the Salt Lake City Case, the Ingersolls 
alleged that Mountain Fuel Supply Company was occupying the 
Vacated Street Property to the exclusion and alleged detriment 
of the Ingersolls. (R. 11:151-157). Furthermore, it was not 
until September 10, 1982 that Judge Fischler signed the final 
Judgment dismissing the Ingersolls' complaint in intervention 
in the Salt Lake City Case "with prejudice on the merits." (R. 
11:242). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
Ingersolls, the most that can be said for the Ingersolls is 
that from and after September 10, 1982 that they began their 
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alleged period of adverse possession. Since their proposed 
complaint in intervention in this case was tendered less than 
four years later, the Ingersolls were incapable of alleging a 
prima facie cause of action for adverse possession. Contrary 
to the Ingersolls' assertions, nothing in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-13 (1953, as amended) (dealing with adverse possession 
of public streets after they have been sold for valuable 
consideration) alters the Ingersolls' need to hold for seven 
years before seeking title by adverse possession. Certainly 
the lower court had no obligation to allow the Ingersolls to 
intervene when the court could rule as a matter of law that the 
Ingersolls could not plead a cause of action for adverse 
possession capable of surviving a motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court order 
granting Interstatefs motion for summary judgment against Mr. 
Patterson and the lower court's order denying the Ingersolls' 
motion to intervene should be affirmed. 
DATED this J&>- day of December, 1987. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Patrick J. O'Hara 
By T&Jt J.0'lk-
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Interstate Land Corporation 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
-AQ-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing Brief of Plaintiff/Respondent 
Interstate Land Corporation to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
this 3 D - day of December, 1987, to the following: 
Ronald C. Barker, Esq. 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
Attorneys for R. D. Patterson, 
Melvin E. Ingersoll, Marian 
Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. 
Ingersoll and Evelyn E. 
Ingersoll 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
libJfr J O J ^ 
64960 
122787 
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Exhibit A 
B Jc- 181977 C / / V 
Recorded it 7 - y ^ ™ 
flequcct ol B ^ ™ ! ! . ^ 5 . t i i g l & Title Company 
KATIL I 
Deputy 
THIS TRUST DEED is cade this £ ~~day of July, 1977, between 
LEMEL CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, and MELVIN E. INCERSOLL and MARIAN 
BEVERLY INCERSOLL, his wife, and LELANj R. INCERSOLL and EVELYN E. INCERSOLL, 
his wife, as Trustors, all of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, BACKMAN ABSTRACT & TITLE COMPANY, as Trustee, and CENERAL BREWING COMPANY, 
a California corporation, as Beneficiary. 
Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER 
OF SALE, the following described property situated In Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah: 
PARCEL 1; All of Block A3. Plat " C . Salt Lake City Survey. 
PARCEL 2: Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block A3, 
Plat MC", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East A feet; 
thence South 660 feet; thence West A feet to the Southeast corner 
of Lot 1 of said Block A3; thence North 660 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
PARCEL 3: Beginning at the Southwest corner of said Block A3, and 
running thence West 99 feet; thence North 2A7.5 feet; thence West 163 
feet, more or less, to the East Bank of the Jordan River; thence 
Northerly along said East Bank to a point due West froa the Northwest 
corner of said Block A3; thence East to the Northwest corner of said 
Block A3; thence South 660 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL A; All of the South half of vacated Tirst South Street lying 
between the West line of Clendale Street produced and' the East Bank of 
the Jordan River* 
PARCEL 5: Commencing at the Southwest corner of Block AA, Plat "C", 
Salt Lake City Survey,and running thence North 10 rods; thence East 
10 rods; thence South 10 rody; thence West 10 rods to the point of 
beginning. 
PARCEL 6: All of Lot 3, Block 1# JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 5A, Plat 
"C", Salt l~' e City Survey. 
Together with the East half of vacated Clendale Street adjoining 
on the ViT.t. 
PARCEL 7: All of Lots 1 and 23, Block 2, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 5A, 
Plat "C", S^lt Lake City Survey. 
Together with the following described portion of vacated Clen-
dale Street adjoining on the East: Commencing 82.5 feet North from the 
Southeast comer of Lot 1, Block 2, said JONES SUBDIVISION, and running 
thence North 66 feet to the Northeast corner of said Lot 23; thence East 
33 feet; thence South 33*A2V West 59.A8 feet to the point of commencement. 
Together with the North one-half of vacated First South Street 
adjoitiJt.j; on the South. 
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING: 
1. An easement for vionstruction and maintenance of an underground conduit along 
the following described line: 
BEGINNING 45.23 feet Wc^i of the City Engineer's M O M X C M 
on 10th West Street ar d 56 feet 'I^ uth of City Engineer's 
Monument on First South Street, ind running t^snee West 
327.27 feet; as created in favor of Utah Power and Light 
Conpany, a corporation, by instrument recorded November 18, 
1916 as Entry No. 369708, Book 3-C, Page 218. 
2. Right of Way for a Railroad spur tract, said right of way being 8-1/2 
feet on each side of, and measured at right angles to, the following 
described center line: 
BEGINNING at a point West All.* feet from the Southwest 
corner of the Intersection of 10th West Street and First 
South Street, running thence Southerly on a 15*30' curve 
to the right * distance of 97.6 leet; thence Southerly on 
a ta.i^ ent to said curve 142.8 feet; thence on a 14* curve 
to the left 172.2 feet to a point on the West line of 10th 
West Street which point is North 113.3 feet from the North 
line of Second South Street; as created in favor of the 
Western Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation, by instrument 
recorded June 27, 1921 as Entry No. 452855 in Book ll-l, 
page 81. 
By Agreement recorded September 9, 192i, Entry No. 542833 in Book 3-V, 
page 573, said Western Pacific Railroai Company granted an easement and 
right-of-way over a portion of above d iscribert tract to Oregon Short 
Line Railroad Company. 
3. An Agreement recorded September 9, 1925 as Entry No. 542834 in Book 3-W, 
puge 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. and The Western 
Pacific Railroad Co. first parties, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., a 
corporation, second party, which provides for relocation of present 
trackage and construction of additional trackage in accordance with a 
plat marked Schedule "A" attached thereto. 
4. A perpetual easement for the sole and exclusive use of Oregon Short Line 
Railroad Company and the Western Pacific Railroad Company for a Right of 
Way for their present spur tracks over the following described land, to wit: 
An irregular tract of land, being a part of Lot 6, Block 43, 
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain portions 
of vacated First South Street (together with other property 
not covered by this deed) more particularly described in 
instrument recorded January 20, 1926 as Entry No. 551852 in 
Book 3-X of Liens and Leases, page 252. 
5. A Right of Way for the purpose of laying, maintaining, operating and removal 
of a gas pipe line along the following described line: 
BECINNINC at the West line of 10th West Street, and running 
West on First South Street, 15 feet South of the center line 
thereof, to the Jordan F-.ver; as created in favor of Utah Gas 
& Coke Company by instn.-aent recorded July 27, 1949, as Entry
 w 
No. 637186 in Book 44, Page 589 of Official Records. g 
A Pole Line Easement ovei tho. following described center line: CD 
ft BECINNINC at a point S;».ith 89*53'22M West 470 feet g from a Monument at the intersection of First South 
and Clendale Streets, and running thence South 0*12'22M 
West 51 feet; thence North 89*58,22u East 436.8 feet; g 
as created in favor of Utah Po^er and Light Company, a 
corporation, by instrument recorded August 23, 1945, as 
Entry No. 1009087 in P:>ok 434, Page 609 of Official 
Records. 
-3-
7 . A K 1 f;l L o f 1 I'".,: \ f <: i an 3 i i i c 11 • ".a t e i j: • 1 j: • c 1,11 * a 11 c i g t "ll'i c !'" c 11 CA 11 ig cl c s c i 1 be d; 
li n e : 
B E C I W I N C at a point S o u t h 12 3L, i et: t.. and Eas t 1 i 36 f eet 
from the Northwest co"ner of Scc11 on 2 , "I"ownship 1 South, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence South 83*10' East 155 feet; thence South 25*30* 
East 85 feet, as disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation 
of I1.iter, recorded May 25, 1950, as Entry No 1201.402 In 
he j-ii 768, Page 266 of Official Records 
i t u a 1 e a s c ncn t f o i a d r a i n a ge d i I < :h a 1 on ,g t h e i» o f t h s 1 d e o f We 61 
, South Street, together J'ith the right of the ( i *. y to enlarge said 
as reserved by Salt Lake City In Instrument recorded September- 22, 
HS Entry No. 343644 In Book 12 -H , page 524 oI" 0f • 'icia 1 Recc • r d < 
• le Line Easement granted to Utah Power & Light Company as recorded 
! ii ii lary 16, 1 9 U . In Book 1 7 7 " , Page 2 4 2 , Entry No. 1756733, Official 
I ords, fo" *h.? ciection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, 
ai id replaced '"-it of the electric transmission distribution and telephone 
circuits of" 11 e C r «• n t. e e a n d t wo an c h o x s a n dl 11 »i e e p o i e s a 1 on g a 1 i n e 
described .»: "c j lens I 
BEGINS K** t a point vithin an existing transmission line »;"'! ilc'h 
is 900 feet South and 1139 feet East, more or less,, from 
the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, Range 
1 Vest, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 6*49' West 540 feet 
on said land and being in 1-*- J ' . £ . : * » ••* * 
* < ..cnt gi anted to Utah Power & "Light Company as recorded 
• ., in Book 1773, Page 243, Entry No. 1756734, Official 
rciuiu* . e erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, 
and rejl«* of the electric transmission distribution and telephone 
Grantee and one guy and 3 poles along a line described as 
BEGINNING at a fence on the North 'boundary line ol the GrantoiB' 
land at a point 845 feet South and 1170 feet East, more or less, 
from the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, Range 
1 Vest, Salt Lake Moridian, thence South 0*02' Last 740 feet, 
more or less, to a fence on the South boundary line of Bald Idiid 
and being In lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2 , 
11 Any other rights of way and easements for road"., ditches, canals,, utiJttirs, 
pipe lines, etc., which n.iv r-«1st nv«»r undrr i •iii-n,« i . HI 1 n 1. 
ILK, £ 1111 I LI III ill building., (ixturub and imp i ovenem « thereon did all vitei ilRtts,, 
rights-of ~u,i) , east'Dftiib, itniis, issues, p r u I I t H , 1 iw nit tenements, heredlta1 i-ntt*, 
privilege b And appurtenances I. he re unto now oi hereatt-'i used "' enjoyed "if I 'i*MM 
prope11 v IIi a m nH I ( thereof; 
FOR THE PURPOSF OF SECURING payment of tlit1 Indebtedness tvldi*nc .<<J In n 
promissory note of even ddtn herewlil , in tht nr Ini lfi«i 1 sum of '> I ,300,0011 Uli, payable K* 
CO 
til the ordeii of Bene! t r i a l y si I I p I lines
 k In i lie mann* i «nd v 1 f lh i n h e r e s ' aa there in 5 
11 1 
set f o r t h , and pa\mcnl of any sums expended ci .nly.iim i I hv Her* I I r l n v 1 p 1 1 e i 1 thej"*** 
o 
s e c u r i t y hereof , H^ 
-4,-
Trustor agrees to p/jy all .axes and assessments on thu above propi rty, 
to pay all charp,«s and assessments on water or water stock. use«! on ct -.'ith sale' 
property, not to commit waste, to maintain adequate fire insurance *>n improvements 
on said property, to pay all costs and expenses of collev.ion (including Trustee's 
and attorney's fees in event of default in payment of the Indebtedness secured 
hereby) and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of rhi services performed by 
Trustee hereunder, including a reconveyance hereof. 
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default 
and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbafore 
set forth. 
LEMEL CORPORATION 
T/ll\*t? C\ i r C(L 
MARIAK BEVERU^lNGERSQLl /j 
LE^AND^R. I N G E R S O L L ^ T 
EVELYN E. INGERSOLL^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake; 
.^.liiiMbftttthe 6 *~ day of C/^^Y J 1977, personally appeared before me 
AVfrXVX'l*. ItfSj&RSOLL, as President'and LELAND R. INGERSOLL, as Secretary of LEMEL 
tjp&ORAtl^N, a Utah corporation, and each duly acknowledged to me that they 
^exegut^d tne^foregoing Instrument on behalf of said corporation by authority of 
\ a ^ eaoJftiflpn of the board of directors of said corporation and that each acknowledged 
» tf3 UJ^t'Ar said corporation executed the same and the seal affixed is the seal of 
/y NOTARY gpSLIC 
I'.; cobmlsslon expires Residing at ^/ItCff* {/~£/£r&7r Q7*?Ff/ ££ 
en 
CD 
CD 
- 5 -
S T . w l OF 
C< J . , 
°
T
 '•
 e
 & tJ~ oay °^ J^"" 'j/LAJ ,
 A>, - i s o n a i l y appeared before 
.. Jr.^XCUV^N L. INSERSOLi., MARIAN BEVtfkLY 1NCKRS0LL, hit- J i f e , and LELAND R. TKCERSOLL 
/ ^ a n d EY£l/*U E, INCERSOLL, h i s w i f e , s i g n e r s of the • •- unenc , who duly 
*-^ »cxn^ov/<)Ldf^d'.co me tha t they executed the aame 
M i v . c ^ i ^ ^ c t o n ^ x p l r e s ^ ^ ' % ^ / 7 7 9 Res iding ai £-,ll€/fT~//f£/6/ffmr f'j/TM 
L i 
t:; 
C"«i 
c 

SI I I E 01 I JTAII, \ 
Cif> End County of Salt Lake1, / 
• M. i 1 eh ( !. 1 1 1 i l j !;! ; r i i • 
» • ** * 
certify that the d?ta< (•• = . l ionitunJ *> i >v<h «c ret* •. '- J I 
o r d i n a n c e ' . . r a t i r r *; \
 Cn<* 11 P =S - : *^ ; > j 0 u u l s t r e e t s wesc o i I 
S - - « 
passed l»j flu1 Hoard id Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, . October 5 , • 1^7 7 
as appears ' M M * 
IN MI1NKSS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the corporate seal of said 
City, this 2 1 s t . day of ' . December . ... 1978—. 
(SEAL) 
City Recorder 
AN ORDINANCE 
AN ORDINANCE VACAT-
ING Glendaie and First South 
Streets west of MOO West Street 
located in Salt Lake C«tv. Utah 
Be It ordained by the Board of 
Commissioners of Salt Lake 
dry . Utah 
SECTION 1 That Glendale 
and First South Streets west of 
MOO West Street located in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, more particu-
larly described as follows, be. 
and the same hereby is. vac-
ated and declared no longer to 
be public property for use as a 
street, svtr%ut. alley or pedes-
trian way 
Beginning at the Southeast 
corner of Lot I. Block I. Jones' 
Subdivision, Block 54. Plat " C " . 
Salt Lake City Survey, said 
point also being the Northwest 
corner of 1100 West and First 
South Streets, and running 
thence South a 2' S3" East 
132 17 feet, thence West 334 00 
leet. thence North 0* 00 55'' 
West 214 63 feet to me North 
east corner of Lot 1, Block 2, 
said Jones' Subdivision, thence 
North XT 42 East 59 4* feet, 
thence East 36 00 feet to me 
Northwest corner of Lot 2, 
Block 1. said Jones' Subdivi-
sion, thence South 132 00 feet, 
mence East 264 00 feet to point 
Of beginning Contains 51,433 32 
souare feet, or 1 190 acres 
Said vacation Is made ex-
pressly subiect to all existing 
rights of way and easements of 
all public utilities of any and 
every description now located 
on. In. under or over the 
confines of the above described 
property, and also subiect to 
the rights of entry thereon for 
the purpose of maintaining, 
altering, repairing, replacing, 
removing or rerouting said 
utilities and ail of them 
SECTION 2 This ordinance 
shall take eHect 30 days after 
its first publication 
Passed by the Board of Com-
missioners of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 5th day of October, 
1977. 
T E D L WILSON 
Mayor 
MILDRED V MIGHAM 
City Recorder (SEAL) 
BILL NO 173 of 1977 
Published October IS. 1977 (B-6) 
bxniDii 
my& svbtc. £<c wi 
331)3351 
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4} VLH&LJA-+1** 
SUBSTITUTION OF TKUSTLL 
RXCHAiiii L, BLANUv, a memliei Jl ill i Ll nil i n t t * Li:ir „ i a ^
 K
y>
 ^^ 
h e r e b y a p p o i n t e d s u c c e s s o r T r u s t e e unde r t h a t cei . a i n Deed of 
6 * 
v • 7 
\ h i , j -
e x e c u t e d b> iiMLL CORPORATION, a Utah Corp< I at Ion» HLLV1MI *>y\d, , \ 
INGEKSOLL a n d / B E V E R L Y fNGEKSOU,, l i l ' i n I I e » LEI AND R. INGERSOLL If A f l 
iN K INGERSOLL, ll L w i l t I -ihi Ii C J M I ' M BREWING XI" 
J H j 
t >* . a l a L i l o r n i a c o i ^ o r a t i o i i i • hamtil as Bt e t i c i a r y and 
BACKMAN ABSTRACT i TITLE COMPANY i s namen AS Ttuf. l e e . 
S a i d Deed of T r u s t i s d a t e d J u l y l»i ) H uni was 
r e c o i d i d .lull , JII I ' l l as E n t r y No, ; 9 7 H I 0 in B ok. 4519 a t Page 
115cl o t the* r e c o r d s of t h e S a i l Lake l o u n l y R e c o i d e r . 
Thv lif i i' ,J Trust , d e s c r i b e d a b o v e i s ma^ 1 <t I • I r e s p e c t 
t o c e r t a i n re A J | i i r o p e r t y # l o c a t e d in S a l t i*ake C i u i a t y , S t a t e of 
' U t a h , mote p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d a s l o l i n w i , , no w i t : 
4. s 
\ 
I 
S E E ATTACHMENT 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands this 
j1'"1/ '. ,v day of August, 1979. 
GENERAL BREWING COMPANY 
* c;- -;.v / / 
^K^ , 
Carl E, Mullen, *r/A P . , $ # c * t a r y 
•- ^. -' Washington 
STATE OF m&mtii 
COUNTY ~T Clark 
b e f o r e - 'wirLL-Mwllcn. Jl% 
1>«r nonia 1 iy ajipif ai ecu 
w h o be 1 n 9 by mi i! 111 \ m w n i' n i d i in a" e a c h t o r h i m s H 11.. tJi .ii l II ici ,. 
*'"*" M 1 " 1 Car l I... H u l l e n . J r . L* U'« M ^ ^ j t i x L a J U L - . . - » •", "l"'"f" 
tl'.fl 1.1 id ll. IIM) Of GENERAL 
CO 
o 
A 
,, BRHMiNG (JOflP ANY, n nd I n a t r, h • 11 V n m n a 11 ! I r e a o i incj i n s t r ume n i i i II y t i 
- 1 -
signed on behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution 
of its Board of Directors, and maid Carl E. Mullen, Jr. 
and _ _ each duly acknowledged to me that 
said „corporation executed the same and that th<? sr*al affixed is 
...••fK^ '^ p^ l ofc uaid corporation* 
My»Cqpwfis3ion Expires: 
Residing at: 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
A copy of the foregoing Substitution of Trustee 
acknowledged *o received this 7 ~~~ day of
 mfgJll72frl6<2S~m 
1979. 
BACKMAN ABSTRACT 6 TITLE COMPANY 
^^J^^rfSttoP*^ 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss« 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
tye&i FlSti&Z. f being on oath first duly sworn 
deposes and says: Acting for and on behalf of 0&H4(2b LSlAAlCJi 
Trustee, I caused a copy to be mailc-d by registered mail, postage 
prepaid, deposited with United States Mail, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
this 7*^ day of , 1979, addressed to 
each of the following: 
LeMel Corporation 
Brewery Mall Division 
1100 West Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Melvln E. Xngersoll 
7»:6 West 1300 South 
St.lt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Beverly In.jorrfo 
766 West 1300 Sou 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Ut.-< 41u« 
Leiand K. Ingeraoll 
1200 South 700 Weet 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah Ml ' f i 
Evelyn E. Ingerso l l 
1200 South 700 West 
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84 J im 
ife 
3 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss« 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Lorraine Wood
 t being duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. That she is employed by Ray, Quinney 6 Nebeker as 
a secretary; 
2. That on the JJ^^day of October, 1979, she per-
sonally deposited in the United States mails, by registered mail, 
postage prepaid, copies of the herein Substitution of Trustee 
to the following persons, being at least all those persons having 
requested copies of any notice of default or notice of sale 
affecting the real property described in said Substitution of 
Trustee, as required by Utah Code Annotated Sections 57-1-22 and 
57-1-26. 
Fibro Company 
c / o William A. Souva l l I I 
3686 West 2100 South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84120 
Smith's Management Corporation 
1550 South Redvood Road 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
DATED t h i s fl % day of October, 1979. 
Subscribed and sworn to before mo t h i s t t ^ day of 
^Coifc&loh Expirest / c < . 
Exhibit D 
NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
3334045 
NOT1CF. IS HEREBY GIVEN: That RICHARD L. BLANCK is 
Trustee under a Deed of Trust dated July 6, 1977, executed by 
LeMel Corporation, a Utah corporation, Melvin E. Ingersoll and 
Beverly Ingersoll, his wife, Leiand R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E. 
Ingersoll, his wife, in which General Brewing Company, * 
California corporation, is named as Beneficiary and Backman 
Abstract & Title Company is named as Trustee, recorded July 18, 
1977, as Entry No, 2971310, in Book 4519, at Page 1159, of 
Official Records in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt 
Laxe County, Utah, describing land therein as: 
SEE ATTACHMENT 
Said obligations include a note in the principal sum of 
$1,800,000.00. 
A breach of, and default in, the obligations for which 
such deed is security has occurred in that payments due on August 
1, 1979 and September 1, 1979, in the total amount of $55,316.66, 
have not beed paid. 
By reason of such default, Richard L. Blanck, as 
Trustee, and General Brewing Company, as Beneficiary, under said 
Deed of Trust, do hereby declare all sums secured thereby imme-
diately due &nd payable and have elected and do hereby elect to 
cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations 
secured thereby. 
DATED this 7th day of September. 
RICHARD L. BLANCK, Trustee 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) 8S. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this 7th day of September, personally appeared betore 
me Richard L. Blanck, as Trustee in the foregoing Notice of 
Defa'u'ijtJ? vtep duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
\ \\ •••<• j- • • NOTARY PUBLIC 
\ \ ^ U B L ^ - ; Residing ?.n Salt Lake County, Utah 
'Mj^&jwi^ajHon ^ xpires s 
*/W0o 
By Agreement recorded September 9, 1925, Entry No. 542833 In Boob 3-V, 
page 573, aald Western Pacific Kailroad Company granted an aascment and 
right-of-vay over a portion of above described tract to Oregon Short 
Line Kailroad Company. 
3. An Agreement recorded September 9, 1925 as Entry Mo. 542834 In Boob 3-W, 
psge 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Kailroad Co. and The Western 
Pacific Kailroad Co. first parties, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., a 
corporation, aecond party, vhich provides for relocation of present 
trackage and construction of additional trackage In accordance with a 
plat marked Schedule "A" attached thereto. 
4. A perpetual aasement f or the aoit and exclusive use of Oregon Short Line 
Kailroad Company and the Western Pacific Kailroad Company for a Kight of 
Way for their present apur tracks over the following described land, to vit: 
An Irregular traet of land, being a part of Lot 6, Block 43, 
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain portions 
of vacated First South Street (together vith other property 
not covered by this deed) more particularly described In 
instrument retarded January 20, 1926 as Entry Ko. 551852 In 
Book 3-X of Liens and Leases, page 252. 
5. A Kight of Way for the purpose of laying, maintaining, operating and removal 
of a gas pipe line along the following described line: 
BEGINNING at the West line of 10th West Street, and running 
West on First South Street, 15 feet Sovth of the center line 
thereof, to the Jordan Kiver; as created in favor of Utah Cas 
4 Coke Company by Instrument recorded July 27, 1949, as Entry 
No. 637166 in Book 44, Par* 569 of Official Kecords. 
6. A Polt Line Easement over the following described enter line: 
BEGINNINC at a point South 69*58922M West 470 feet 
from a Monument at the intersection of Flrat South 
and Clendale Streets, and running thence South 0W12'22" 
West 51 feet; thence North 69*58'22" East 43*.8 feet; 
as created in favor of Utah Power and Light Company, a 
corporation, by instrument recoxded August 23, 1945, as 
Entry No. 1009087 In Book 434,*l'age 609 of Official 
Kecords. 
7. A Kight of Way for a 3 Inch water pipeline along the following described 
line: 
BEGINNING at a point South 1236 feet and East 1136 feet 
from the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, 
Kange 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence South 63*10* East 155 feet; thenca South 25*30* 
E*st 65 feet, as disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation 
of Water, recorded May 25, 1950, as Entry No. 1201402 in 
Book 768, Page 266 of Official Ktcords. 
8. A perpetual casement for a drainage ditch along the North aide of West 
First South Street, together with the right of the City to enlarge aald 
ditch, as reserved by Salt Lake City In instrument recorded September 22, 
1925, as Entry No. 543644 in Book 12-B, page 524 of Official Ktcorda. 
9. A Pole Line Easement granted to Utah Power 4 Light Company as recorded 
January 16, 1961, in Book 1773, Page 242, Entry No. 1736733, Official 
Kecords, for the erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, 
and replacement of the electric transmission distribution and telephone 
circuits of the Crantee and tvo anchori and three poles along a lint 
described ^ follows: 
BEGINNING at a point within an existing transmission line vhich 
is 900 faat South and 1139 feet East, mora or less, from 
the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, Kange 
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 6*49* West 540 faat 
cm aald land and being In Lota 3 and 6 of «fid Section 2. 
if) 
H 
Co 
A Folt Lint Easement granted to Utah Fovtr a Light Coapany at recorded 
January 16, 1961, In look 1773, fage 243, Entry Mo. 17*673*. Official 
fcecorde, for tht artetlon and continued nainttnanct, repair, alteration, 
and rcplactatnt of tht altctrlc trantalttlon distribution and telephone 
cireuitt of tht Grant at and ent guy and 3 poltt along a lint described at 
follows: 
IEC1NNINC at a fence on tht llorth hound try lint of tht Grant era' 
land at a point 145 fttt South and 1170 fttt East, aort or lost, 
froa tht Northvtst corner of Section 2, Tovnshlp 1 South, Range 
1 Vest, Salt Lata Meridian, thence South 0*029 Eatt 740 fttt. 
•ore or less, to a ftnet en tht South boundary lint of atld land 
and being In Lota 3 and 6 of said Section 2. 
Any other rights of vay and eateaentt for roads, ditches, canals, utilities, 
pipe lines, etc*, which »sy exist over, under or across said land. 
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oor 4 110 NOTICE OF DEFAULT >*f 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVENt That RICK/AD L. BLANCK is Suc-
cessor Trustee under a Deed of Trust dated July 6, 1977, executed by 
LeMel Corporation, a Utah corporation, Melvin E. Ingersoll and Marian 
Beverly Ingersoll, his wife, Leiand R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Inger-
soll, his wife, as Trustors, in which Gener<<3 Brewing Company, a 
California corporation, is named as Beneficiary and Backman Abstract 
6 Title Company is named as Trustee, recorded July 18, 1977, as 
Entry No. 2971310, in Book 4519, at Pagi. 1159, of Official Records 
in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt Laks 'Jour-.y, Utah, de-
scribing land therein at: 
SEE ATTACHMENT 
Said RICHARD L. BLANCK was substituted as Trustee under said 
Deed of Trust by a substitution of Trustee dated the 31st day of 
August , 1979 and recorded October 19 , 1979, 
as Entry No, 3353351 in Book at Page 
of tho Official Records in the Office of the County Recorder of 
Salt Lake County, Utih* 
The obligations for which the trust property was conveyed 
as security include a note in the principal sum of $1,800,000.00. 
A breach of, and default xn, the obligations for which said Deed of 
Trust is security has occarred in that payments due on Auoust 1, 1979 
and September 1, 1979, in the total amount of $55,316.66, have not 
been paid. A further breach of, and default in, the covenants con-
tained in said Deed of Trust has occurred in that the Trustors have not 
paid 1977 General Property Taxes or 1978 General Proparty Taxes, 
causing the above-described secured land to be sold by a Tax Sale to 
Salt Lake County. 
By reason of such defaults, Richard L. Blanck, as Trustee, 
and General Brewing Company, aa Beneficiary, under said Deed of Trust, 
do hereby declare all sums secured thereby Immediately due and pay-
•&> 
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able and have alcctod and do hereby elect to cauae the truat property 
to be sold to aatlafy the obligations secured thereby. 
DATED thla^J} 3»day of October, 157 9. 
RICHARD L. BLANCK, Trustee 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
) «a 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On thisZZhd day of October, 1979, personally appeared 
before me RICHARD L. BLANCK, as Trustee in the foregoing Notice of 
Default, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
fcV*-
 r : NOXAR*PUBLIC-, JT / J T7T/ 
\^.OBVN%/ Residing! \JJt/A %*Aj fo. 6&/U\ 
ffijpCffi&sXbn Expires: 
-2-
PAECEL If All of Block 43, flat "C", Salt Lake City Survey. 
PARCEL 2: Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block A3, 
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survty, and running thence East 4 feet; 
thence South 660 feet; thence Veat 4 fact to the Southxaet corner 
of Lot 1 of eald Block 43; thence Worth 660 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
PARCEL 38 Beginning at tha Southwest corner of said Block 43. and 
running theme Veat 99 feet; thence Xoftb 247*3 feet; thence Vest 163 
feet, sore or leaa9 to the Cast Bank of the Jordan ftlver; thence 
northerly along said East Bank to a point due Veat ft on the Northwest 
corner of aaid Block 43; thence East to the Northwest comer of aaid 
Block 43; thence South 660 feet to the point of beginning. 
PAKCEL 4; All ©f the South half of vacated ttret South Street lying 
between the Vest lint of CIendele Street produced and* the Eaet Bank of 
the Jordan River* 
PARCEL 3; Commencing at the Southwest toner of Block 44, Plat t,CMt 
Salt Lake City Survey.end running thence North 10 roda; thence East 
20 rods; thence South 10 roda; thence Vest 10 roda to the point of 
beginning. 
PAECEL 6t All of Lot 3, Block 1, JOKES SUBDIVISION of Block 34, Plat 
"C", Salt Lake City Survey. 
Together vlth tha Eaat half of vacated CI end ale Street adjoining 
on the Vest. 
PAECEL 7t All of Lota 1 and 23, Block 2, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 34, 
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey* 
Together vlth tha following deacrlbed portion of vacated Clen-
dele Street adjoining oa tht Easts Commeoeiog 82.3 feet North froa the 
Southeast comer of Lot 1, Block 2, aaid JONES SUBDIVISION, and running 
thence Korth 66 feet to the Northeast comer of aaid Lot 23; thence East 
33 fttt; thence South 33*42* Vest 39.48 feet to the point of commencement. 
Together vlth tht North one-half of vacated rivet South Street 
adjoinioj; oa the South* 
SUBJECT TO THE POLLOVZNC: 
1. An eeaeacot for cone t met ion and maintenance of an underground conduit along 
the following described line! 
BEGINNING 45.23 feet Vest of the City Engineer's Monument 
on 10th Veat Street and 36 feet South of City* Engineer 'a 
Monument on First South Street* and running thence Vest 
327.27 feet; at created in favor of Utah Power and Light 
Company, a corporation, by instrument recorded November 18. 
1916 as Entry No. 369208, Book 3-C, l»age 228. 
2* JUght of Vay for a Kailroad ef>ur tract* aaid right of vay being 8-1/2 ' 
feet on each aide of, and measured at right anglea to, the following 
deacrlbed center line! 
BEGINNING at a point Veat 411.3 feet froa the Southwest 
comer of the Intersection of 10th Vast Street and First 
South Street, running thence Southerly cm a 15*30* curve 
to tha right a distance of 97.6 feet; thence gouthcrly cm 
a tangent to said curve 142.8 feat; thence on a 14* curve 
to tha left 172.2 feet to a point on the Vait line of 10th 
Vast Street vtiich point le North 113.3 feet frrm the North 
line of Second South Street; ae created in favor of the 
Vtittm Pacific Hail road Company, c corporation, by instrument 
recorded June 27, 1921 aa Entry ft». 432633 in Book 11-2, 
page 81. 
By Agreement recorded September f, 1923, Entry Ho. 542833 in look 3-V, 
page 373t oald Vaatarn Pacific Railroad Company granted an eattmsnt and 
right-of-way ovar a portion of above described tract to Oragoo Short 
Line Railroad Company. 
An Agreement racordad September 9# 1925 aa Entry Mo. 542134 in Book 3-V, 
page 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co* and The Western 
Pacific Railroad Co. first parties, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., a 
corporation, aecond party, which provldaa for relocation of present 
trackage and construction of additional trackage In aecordanca with a 
plat marked Schedule "A" attached thereto. 
A perpetual easement for the tola and exclusive use of Oregon Short Line 
Railroad Company and the Western Pacific Railroad Company for a Right of 
Way for their preaent apur tracke ever the following described land, to wit: 
An Irregular tract of land, being a part of Lot 6, Dock 43, 
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain yortione 
of vacated First South Street (together with other property 
mot covered by this deed) sore particularly described in 
instrument recorded January 20, 1926 as Entry Mo. 551(52 in 
Book 3-X of Liens and Leases, page 252. 
A Right of Way for the purpose of laying, maintaining, operating and removal 
of a gas pipe line along the following described line: 
BEGINNING at tht West lint of 10th West Street, and rvnnlng 
West on First South Stiitet, 15 feet South of the center line 
thereof, to tht Jordan River; at created in favor of. Utah Cas 
ft Coke Coapsny by instrument recorded July 27, 194?, as Entry 
No. 637166 in Book 44, Paga 589 of Official Records. 
A Pole Line Easement ovar the following described center line: 
BEGINNING at a point South B9°5S'22H West 470 feet 
from a Monument at tht intersection of First South 
and Clendale Streeta, and running thence South 0°12'22" 
West 51 feet; thenct North B9*5B'22M East 436.1 feet; 
aa created in favor of Utah Power and Light Company, a 
corporation, by instrument recorded August 23, 1945, as 
Entry No. 1009087 in Booh 434,- Page 409 of Official 
Records. 
A Right of Way for a 3 Inch vatar pipeline along the following described 
lint: 
BEGINNING at a point South 1236 feet and East 1136 feet 
from the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence South 83*10* East 155 feet; thenca South 25*30* 
East 65 fast, as disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation 
of Water, recorded May 25, X950, as Entry No. 1201402 in 
Book 768, Pagt 266 of Official Records. 
A perpetual tasement for a dralntgt ditch along tht North aldt of West 
First South Strtet, togtthtr with tha right of tht City to anltrgt said 
ditch, as reserved by Salt Lakt City la instrument recorded September 22, 
1925, at Entry Ho. 543644 la Book 12-H, page 524 of Official Records. 
A Pole Lint Easement grtnttd to Utah Power ft Light Company me recorded 
January 16, 1961, la Book 1773, Pagt 242, Entry No. 1756733, Official 
Records, for tht erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteretlon, 
and replseement of tht altctrle transmission distribution and telephone 
circuits of tht Grantee and two anchors and three poles along a line 
described as follows! 
BEGINNING at a point within an exist leg transmission line which 
la 900 feet South and 1139 feet Eaat, more cr leas, from 
tha Northwest corner of Section 2, Townahlp 1 South, Range 
1 Weat, Salt Lake Merldlen, thence South 6*49* Wast 540 feet 
on aald land and being In Lots 3 and 6 of oald Section 2. 
10. A Felt Lint Cessment granted to Utah Fover ft Light Cosptny at rtcordtd 
Janutry 16, 1*61, In Book 1773, F M e 241. totry Ho. 1756714, ©fiieitl 
JUcordt. for the aractioa and ccmtlnutd atinttntnet. reptlr, alteration^ 
and rtpltctvent of tht altctrle transmittion dlttrlbution and telephone 
cireuitt of tht Cranttt and one guy and S polet along a lint described at 
followst 
1CCINKXKC at'a fence on tht Worth hound try lint of tht Grantors9 
land at a point S43 fttt South and 1170 fatt Sett. »ort or less, 
froa the Horthvttt comer of Section 2, Tovnthip 1 South, fttngt 
1 Vest. Salt Laha Meridian, thtnct South 0#029 Lett 740 fttt. 
•ore or lest, to a ftnct on tht South boundary line of atid land 
and htlng In Lota 3 and 6 of atid Section 2. 
XI* Any othtr xightt of wsy and eateatate for rotds. ditches, ctnslt. utilities, 
pipe linet, ate, which mty exist over, isndtr or across stld land. 
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Moil tax notice to.. .Address.. 
3431368 QUIT CLAIM DEED 
MELVIN E. INGERSOLL and MARIAN BEVERLY TCERSOUL. h i s wife , and 
LELAND R. INGERSOLL and EVELYN E. INGERSOLL, h i s wife . trmntors 
of S a l t Lake C i t y , County of S a l t Lake , State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT CLAIM to liMEL CORPORATION. 
of 
?%\^ . , .^"fof"otKr"i^"a^"vaIuaXIe*c5KI3efationT 
tl »e lollowi11* described tract of I widln 
State of Uvih to wit: 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS 
Sale Lake Cennty. 
/ /&. to 
SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO 
WITNESS the hand of said cantor , ih 
STATE OF tJTAH. 
County of Salt Lake 
On the day of May 
0 #/v'.>v\ 
W 80, 
personally appeared before me 
*7->A 
CD 
H7.VIN E. EEERSOLL and MARIAN BEVERLY INGERSOLL. his wife, and LELAM/R';- ".J'"'" ' =r 
INCKR90LL and EVELYN E. INCERSOLL, his wife "•••.'/ * .* - £ 
the signers of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that t he y executed the'sa'nie. *^» 
i . . . .«..- r »1C r : 
r3:$3... 
Notary Public, resu'inp 
Salt I^ike Cltv. Utah My eornminsion expires 
T H I « nrto raiNTCo c«^cr«*LL« roa i*MOTo-MCCOAOiNa. use ei>c« ****. * N O T V H 
SCHEDULE "A" 
Parcel 1; QZ^"^^" *^ 
All of Block 43, Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey. 
Parcel 2: / 
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block 43, ,-
Plat MC", Salt Laktr City Survey, and running thence CJH"*!'~ ' 
East 4.0 feet; thence So-ith 660.C feet: thence Jest 
4.C feet to the Southeast corner of Lot i of said Block 
43; thence North 660.0 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel 3: 
BEGINNINC at the Southwest corner of said BlocJ' 43, and 
running thence Vest 99.0 feet; thence North 247.5 feet; 
thence West 163.0 feet, core or less, to the East Bank ^ s 
of the Jordan River; thence Northerly along said East k^o3>~*~^-*' 
Bank to a point due West fron the Northwe*t corne- of 
said Block 43; thence East to the Northvcst corner of 
said Block 43; thence South 660.0 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Parcel 4: 4 
All of the South half of vacated FiTst South StTeet lying tS&l-j££,7-/4 
| between th* list line of Clendale Street produced and the 
[East Bank of the Jordan River. 
Parcel 5; ' 
COMMENCING at the Southwest corner of Block 44, Plat "C\ ^f/e/-Z/8~ 
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North 10 rods; 
thence East 10 rods; thence South 10 rods; thence West 
10 rods to the point of beginning. 
Parcel 6; 
All of Lot 3, Block 1, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 54, 
Plat "C", Salt lake City Survey. ^^-y„>UCj J *<~ 
TOGETHER WITH the East half of vacated Clendale Street 
adjoining on the West 
Parcel 7; ,, •" 
' All of Lots 1 and 23, Block 2, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 54 ,jQf£/-26 
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, " 
TOGETHER WITH the following described portion of vacated Clendale 
Street adjoining en the East: 
-2 
CO.1 MENCINC 82.5 feet North from the Southeast comer of 
Lot 1. Block 2, said JONES SUBDIVISION, and running 
thence North 66.0 feet to the Northeast corner of said 
Lot 23, thence East 33.0 feet; thence South 33*42* West 
59.48 feet to the point of commencement. 
I 
TOCETHER WITH the North one-half of vacated First South 
Street adjoining on the South. 
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING: 
t 
1. An easement for construction and maintenance of an underground conduit 
along the following described line: 
BECINNINC 45.23 feet West of the City Engineer's Monument 
on 10th West Street and 56 feet South of City Engineer's /"*^/-'//~/3 
Monument on First South Street, and running thence West - - ^ 
327.27 feet; as created in favor of Utah Power and Light 
Company, a corporation, by Instrument recorded November 18, 
1916 as Entry No. 36920b, Book 3-C, Page 218. 
2. Right of Way for a Railroad spur tract, said rlfcht of way being 8-1/2 
feet on each side of,'and measured at right angles to, the following 
described center line: 
BECINNINC at a point West 411.5 feet from the Southwest 
corner of the ^ Intersection of 10th West Street and First 
South Street 7'running thence Southerly on a 15*30' curve jCzH-H)' '*"J 
to the right t distance of 97.6 feet; thence Southerly c n ^ ^ 
a tangent to said curve 142.8 feet; thence on a 14* curve 
t* the left 1 7 ^ ^ feet to a point on the West line of 10th 
West Stre£?jBjtfh point is North 113.3 feet from the North 
line of Se~€oftd~ "South Street; as created in favor of the 
Western Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation, by instrument 
recorded June 27, 1921 mt Entry Vo. 452855 in Book 11-1, 
page 81. 
By Agreement recorded September 9, 1925, Entry No. 542833 In Book 3-V, 
page 573, *miA, IjgfrLfflF^*'*4**'* Railroad Company granted an easement and 
right-of-way over a portion of above described tract to Oregon Short 
Line X2flrohad Company. 
3. An Agreement recorded September 9, 1925 as Entry No. 542834 in Book 3-V, 
page 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. and The Western 
Pacific Railroad Co. first parties, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., a . ,r 
corporation, second party, which provides for relocation of present G 2 * l " •'*•-
tracka^e^and construction of additional trackage In accordance with a 
plat marked Schedule "A" attached thereto. 
4. A perpetual casement for the sola anrt exclusive use of Oregon Short Lint 
Railroad Company and the Western Pacific Railroad Company for a Right of 
Way for their present spur tracks over the following described land, to vlt: _ 
• / An Irregular tract of land, being a part of Lot 6, Block 43, ^ 
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain portions ' O 
of vacated First South Street (together with other property . .^  J*J 
not covered by this deed) more particularly described in C^M""* ' V 
instrument recorded January 20, 1926 as Entry No. 551852 In j? 
Book 3-X of Liens and Leases, page 252. ^ 
5. A Right of Way for the purpose of laying, maintaining, operating and removal £? 
of a gas pipe line along the following described line: 
BECINNINC at the West line of 10th West Street, and running £^'f-*/l~ /7 
Wect on First South Street, 15 feet South of the center line pv^ - --?->£ 
thereof, to the JoTdan River; as r eated in favor of Utah Cas ^ o « ^ ~ ' ^~ 
4 CoVe Company by instrument recorded July 27, 1949, as Entry 
No. 637186 in Book 44, Page 569 of Official Records. 
-3-
6. A Pole Line Ensement over the following described center linr: 
(ill ffP I '
 A y BEC1MK1HC at a point South 89*58*22M Vest 470 feet ~^*^ 
Irs// * Cs'-.ty/t^i. from a Monument at the intersection of First South £ j Q ;» -7 — ?<\ 
' ~ ' ' *J O'*' a n d C l e n d a l e Streets, and running thence South 0#12'22" ^ ^ 3 
/- /.-/*< * ' <' wcst 51 feet; thence Korth 89*58,22" East 436.8 feet; 
•*" as crr.atei* in favor of Utah Power and Light Company, a 
r\/ .y/f »/•/{/ ^- I corporation, by instrument recorded August 23, 1945, as 
.-r //t. *• j
 E n t r y No# J009087 in Book 434, Page 609 of Official 
,fr Si ~J Records. /" 
J 
A Right of Vay for a 3 inch water pipeline along the following described 
line: 
. ^ 
, : ' - " 
BECINNINC at a point South 1236 feet and East 1136 feet 
t) '' from the Northwest corner of Section 2, To.-nship 1 South, o — * ^ ,, 
Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running X?S2>~ ' * ^ 1 
thence South 83*10' East 155 feet; thence South 25*30' 
' \ East 85 feet, as dltclosed by Certificate of Appropriation 
of Vatsr, recorded Kay 25, 1950, as Entry No. 1201*02 in 
Book 768, Page 266 of Official Records. 
i 8. A perpetual easement for a drainage ditch along the North side of Vest 
First South Street, together with the right of the City to enlarge said 
ditch, as reserved by Salt Lake City in Instrument recorded September 22, 
1925, as Entry No. 543644 in Book 12-H, page 524 of Official Records. -
9. A Pole Line Easement granted to Utah Power & Light Company as recorded 
January 16, 1961, in Book 1773, Page 242, Entry No. 1756733, Official 
Records, for the erection and continued caintenance, repair, alteration, 
and replacement of the electric transmission distribution and telephone 
circuits of the Grantee and two anchors and three poles along a line 
described as follows: 
* BECIKNINC at a point within an existing transmission lint which 
v .^  is 900 feet South and 1139 feet East, more or less, from 
•?• •' . the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, Range .J^Q2r~l~ 3 
•^ . '" 1 Vest, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 6*49' Vest 540 feet 
. on said land and being In Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2. 
10. A Pole Line Easement granted to Utah Power & Light Company as recorded 
January 16, 1961, in Book 1773, Page 243, Entry No. 1756734, Official 
Records, for the erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, 
and replacement of the electric transmission distribution an<? telephone 
circuits of the Grantee and one guy and 3 poles alongY line described as 
follows: . \ 
BECIKNINC at a fence on the North boundary line of the Crantora' 
land at a point 845 feet South and 1170 feet East, more or less, 
from the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, Range 
1 Vest, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 0*02' East 740 feet, 
more or less, to a fence on the South boundary line of said land 
and being in Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2. & S 3 - 7 * " " - 3 3 
11. Any other rights of vay and easements for roads, ditches, canals, utilities! 
pipe lines, etc., which nay exist over, under or across said land. 
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Exhibit G 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
In re: 
LEMEL CORPORATION, 
Debtor. 
No. 80-00755 
ORDER WITH RESPECT TO 
TRUSTEE'S INTENT TO 
SELL REAL PROPERTY 
" ?2 
u * * 
0 * -< w 
a < j i 
iVA 
V „ 5
 k-
< £ 5 
A hearing was held before the Honorable Ralph R. 
Mabey, United States Bankruptcy Judge, on the 24th day of 
May, 1982, at 5:15 p.m. in connection with objections to the 
Notice of Trustee's Intent to Sell Real Property. The 
Trustee, NACM Intermountain, Inc., was represented by 
Herschel J. Saperstein and Weston L. Harris of the firm of 
Watkiss & Campbell; Salt Lake City Corporation was repre-
sented by Judy F. Lever; Mountain Fuel Supply Company was 
represented by James S. Lowrie of the firm of Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough; and Roger Segal of the Firm of Cohne, 
Rappaport & Segal represented General Brewing Company. 
Herschel J. Saperstein, counsel for Trustee, represented to 
the Court that it was the Trustee's intention to sell all the 
real property in which the Debtor held an interest and that 
the property description in the Trustee's Notice had erro-
neously omitted describing certain contiguous portions of 
vacated First South Street west of 1100 West Street and 
Glendale Street north of First South Street in which the, 
estate may have an interest. Counsel for the Trustee further 
represented that the proposed sale by the Trustee of the 
estate's interest in such vacated property would be subject 
to the interest claimed by Salt Lake City Corporation as set 
forth in Case No. 78-7764 pending in the Third Judicial 
District Court of the State of Utah in" Salt Lake County, 
styled Salt Lake City v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, et 
al., and that all parties that had indicated an interest in 
bidding on the real property owned by the estate had been 
notified of the claim of Salt Lake City. The Court having 
considered the Notice of Trustee's Intent to Sell Real 
Property and the further representations of Trustee's counsel 
in connection therewith, together with the Objection to 
Trustee's Intention to Sell Property of Salt Lake City 
Corporation, and the Court having determined that the 
requirements of notice and hearing pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §363 
had been met, it is hereby 
ORDERED that NACM Interraountain, Inc., the Trustee, 
be and it hereby is authorized to sell the real property of 
the debtor in accordance with the terms of the Notice of 
Trustee's Intent to Sell Real Property of the Estate filed 
with the Court together with representations of Trustee's 
counsel. Said real property consists of the complex at 
approximately 1100 West 200 South, including the estate's 
interest in those contiguous portions of vacated First South 
Street west of 1100 West and Glendale Street north of First 
South Street, all of which property is located in Salt Lake 
City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and more particularly 
described as follows: 
PARCEL •(?. 1; 
All of Block U3, Plat "C% Salt Lake City Survey 
PARCEL 10, 2, 
Beginn ing a t t h e N o r t h e a s t corner of Lot 8, Block H3, P la t 
"C", S a l t Lake City Survey and running t h e n c e East U f e e t ; 
t h e n c e South 660 f e e t ; thence West 1 fee t to the Southeast 
c o r n e r of Lot 1 of s a i d Block 4 3 ; t h e n c e North 660 f e e t 
to the poin t of beg inn ing . 
PARCEL MO. V* 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of said Block ^3, and 
running thence West 99 feet; thence North 2^7.5 feet; thence 
West 163 feet, more or less, to the East bank of the Jordan 
River; thence Northerly along said East bank to a point 
due West from the Northwest corner of said Block K3; thence 
East to the Northwest corner of said Block 13; thence South 
660 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL MO. »: 
A l l of t h e South h a l f of v a c a t e d F i r s t South S t r e e t ly ing 
between the West l i n e of G l e n d a l e S t r e e t produced and t h e 
East Bank of the Jordan River . 
PARCEL WO. 5 : 
Commencing at the Southwest corner of Block ^ , Plat "C", 
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North 10 rods; 
thence East 10 rods: thence South 10 rods; thence Vest 
10 rods to the point or beginning. 
PARCEL MO. 6: 
a l l of Lot 3 , Block 1, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 5*. P la t 
"C", S a l t Lake City Survey. 
T o g e t h e r w i t h t h e e a s t h a l f of v a c a t e d Glenda le S t r e e t 
ad jo in ing on the West. 
A H of Lots 1 and 23, Block 2, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 
5*, Plat mC*t Salt Lake City Survey. 
Together with the following described portion of vacated 
Glendale Street adjoining on the East; Commencing; 8 2.5 
feet North from the Southeast corner of Lot 1, *1OCK <:, 
said JONES SUBDIVISION, and running thence North 6b reet 
to the Northeast corner of said Lot 23; thence East 33 
feet; thence South 33#*2' West 59.*8 feet to the point 
of commencement. 
Together with the North one-half of vacated First South 
Street adjoining on the South. 
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS OF WAY AND EASEMENTS AND INTERESTS; 
1. An Easement for construction and maintenance of an underground 
conduit along the following described line: Beginning 
45.23 feet Vest of the City Engineer's monumnet on 10th 
Vest Street and 56 South of Gity Engineer's monument on 
First South Street, and running thence Vest 327.27 feet, 
as created in favor of Utah Power & Light Company, a Corpor-
ation, by instrument recorded November 18, 1916, as Entry 
No. 369208 in Book 3-G, page 218. 
2. Right of Vay for a Railroad spur tract, said right of way 
being 8 1/2 feet on each side of, and measured at right 
angles to, the following described center line: 
BEGINNING at a point Vest 1*11.5 feet from the Southwest 
corner of the Intersection of 10th Vest Street and First 
South Street, running thence Southerly on a 15°30* curve 
to the right a distance of 97.6 feet; thence Southerly 
on a tangent to said curve 1*2.8 feet; thence on a !*• 
curve to the left 172.2 feet to a point on the Vest line 
of 10th Vest Street which point is North 113-3 feet from 
the North line of Second South Street; as created in favor 
of the Vestern Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation, 
by instrument recorded June 27, 1921 as Entry No. *52855 
in Book 11-1 at page 81. 
By Agreement recorded September 9, 1925, Entry No. 5*2833 
in Book 3-V, page 573t said Vestern Pacific Railroad Company 
granted an easement and right-of-way over a portion of 
above described tract to Oregon Short Line Railroad Company. 
3. An Agreement affecting this and other property, recorded 
September 9, 1925 as Entry No. 5*283* in Book 3-V, page 
338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., and 
The Vestern Pacific Railroad Co., First Parties, and Fisher 
Terminal Varehouse Co., a corporation, Second Party, which 
provided for relocation of present trackage and construction 
of additional trackage in accordance with a plat narked 
Schedule "A", attached thereto. 
4. A P e r p e t u a l E i s e i e n t for the s o l e and e x c l u s i v e use of 
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, and the Western P a c i f i c 
R a i l r o a d Company, for a r igh t of way for t h e i r present 
spur tracks over the following land, t o - w i t : an i r r e g u l a r 
t r a c t of land being a part of Lot 6, Block * 3 , Plat "C«, 
Salt Lake City Survey, and those certa in portions of vacated 
Firs t South Street (together with other property not covered 
by t h i s report ) , more p a r t i c u l a r y descr ibed in instrument 
r e c o r d e d January 2 0 , 1926, as Entry No- 551852 in Book 
3-X of Liens and Leases, at page 252. 
5. A Right of Way f o r the purpose of l a y i n g , mainta in ing , 
operating and removing a gas pipe l i n e along the f o l l o w i n g 
descr ibed l i n e : Beginning at the West l i n e of 10th West 
S t r e e t , and running thence West on F i r s t South S t r e e t , 
15 f e e t South of the Center l i n e t h e r e o f , to the Jordan 
River , as crea ted in favor of Utah Gas & Coke Company, 
by instrument recorded July 27, 19*9 aa Entry No. 637166 
in Book 44 at page 589 of Of f i c ia l Records. 
6. A Pole l i n e Easement over the f o l l o w i n g descr ibed center 
l i n e : 
B e g i n n i n g at a point South " S ^ S ^ " West *70 f e e t from 
a monument at the in tersec t ion of F i r s t South and Glendale 
S t r e e t s , and running thence South 0 ° 1 2 f 2 2 " West 51 f e e t ; 
thence North 89°58 f22" East 436.8 f e e t , as created in favor 
of Utah Power & Light Company, a corporation, by instrument 
recorded August 23t 19*»5. as Entry No. 1009087 in Book 
»43U at page 609 of Off ic ia l Records. 
7* A Right of Way for a 3 Inch water pipeline along the following described 
l ine! 
Beginning at a point South 1236 feet and East 1136 feet from the Northwest 
corner of Section 29 Township 1 South, Range 1 Wert, Salt Lake Base k Meridianl and 
ruining thence South 63 10v Seat 155 feet; thence South 25 30' East 85 feet, as 
disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation of Water, recorded Kay 1950, as Efatrf 
No. 120U02 In Book 766, page 266 of Official Records. 
A Perpetual easement for a drainage ditch along the North 
s ide of West F i r s t South S t r e e t , t o g e t h e r with the r i g h t 
o f t h e C i t y t o e n l a r g e sa id d i t c h , as reserved by S a l t 
Lake C i t y , in instrument recorded September 22, 1925 as 
Entry No. 5^36UU in Book 12-H, page 524 of Off ic ia l Records. 
Supplementa l Agreement for maintenance and operat ion of 
trackage s erv ing the Fisher Brewing Company dated March 
11, I960, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 
and The Western Pacif ic Railroad Company, recorded December 
2 1 , I960 , as Entry No. 1752826 in Book 1767 at page 1*5 
of Of f i c ia l Records. 
Easement for pole lines and Incidental purposes as created 
in favor of Utah Power A Light Company by instrument recorded 
January 16, 1961 . as Entry Mo. 1756733 in Book 1773 at 
page 2*2 of Official Records, over the following described 
line: 
Beginning at a point within an existing transmission line 
which is 900 feet South and 1135.0 feet East, more or less, 
from the Northwest corner of Section 2f Township 1 South, 
Rnage 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence South 
O S 0 ^ * Vest 5*»0 feet on said land and being in Lots 3 and 
6, of said Section 2. 
Easement for pole lines and incidental purposed as created 
in favor of Utah Power a Light Company by instrument recorded 
January 16, 1961, as Entry Mo. 175673* in Book 1773 «t 
page 2*3 of Official Records over the following described 
line: 
Beginning at a point at a fence on the North boundary line 
of the said land at a point 8*5.0 feet South and 1170.0 
feet East, more or less, from the Northwest corner of Section 
2, Township 1 South, Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
thence South 0*02' East 7*0.00 feet more or less, to a 
fence on the South boundary line of said land and being 
in Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2. 
Easement for utilities and incidental purposes over and 
?«•«"« o f a r S ? 1 / 0 ; 2 " r«erved in favor of Salt Lake 
Si ^ M P C C * 1 * lai? ?22S r e c o r d « d December 17, 1962 as Entry 
No. 1888556 in Book 1998 at page 191 of Official Records. 
The intertat if any, of The Vestern Pacific Railroad Coapeny, 
a Delaware Corporation, acquired under and by virtue of 
the Corporate Warranty Deed from The Veatern Pacific Railroad 
Company, a California Corporation, dated March 29, 1979 
and recorded on April *, 1979 aa Entry Mo. 3259800 in Book 
a839 at page 718 of Official Records, of the following 
tracts 
The North 1/2 of vacated Plrat South Street adjoining Lot 
1, Block 2, Jonea Subdivision on the South thereof. Also, 
all of the South one-half of vacated Flrat South Street 
lying between the Vest line of Clendale Street produced 
and the East Bank of the Jordan River. Also, the Eaat 
1/2 of vacated Clendale Street which abutts on the Vest 
aide of Lot 3, Block 1, Jonea Subdivision (of Block 5*» 
Plat *C*t Salt Lake City Survey.) Also, Beginning 82.5 
feet North from the Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 2, 
Jonea Subdivision, and*running thence North *9.5 feet to 
the Northeast corner of Lot 23, of said Subdivision; thence 
Eaat 33 feet; thenca South 33 f*2' Vest 59.*8 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
The interest if any, of the Crocker National Bank, a National 
Banking Association, et al., acauired under and by virtue 
of the Second Supplemental Indenture dated April U, 1979 
and recorded April U, 1979 as Entry No. 3259 802 in Book 
UB?9 at page 711 of Official Records, of the saie tracts 
described under Item No. II hereof. 
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15. Any other rights of way and easements for 
roads, ditches, canals, utilities, pipe lines, 
etc., which may exist over, under or across 
said land; 
together with any interest of the estate in vacated First 
South Street west of 1100 West Street and Glendale Street 
north of First South, which is contiguous to the subject real 
property described above, but subject to any rights therein 
of Salt Lake City Corporation as claimed in Case No. 78-7764 
pending in the Third Judicial District Court of the State of 
Utah in Salt Lake County, styled Salt Lake City v. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company, et al. 
DATED th is >7 day of //L &s . 1982. 
TOE # • L?H ft. MAS E V 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Weston L. Harris 
Attorney for Trustee 
Greg R. Hawkins 
Attorney for Salt Lake City Corp. 
James S. Lowrie 
Attorney for Mountain Fuel Supply Co. 
Roger Segal 
Attorney for General Brewing Company 
Exhibit H 
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^- TRUSTEE'S DEED 1*?2*~ 
J68'#90 ^ 
THIS INDENTURE, Hade thin 3rd day of June, 1982# 
between NACM INTERMOUNTAIN, the duly appointed, qualified and 
actieg Trustee of the estate of LeMel Corporation, and 
GENE PAL BREWING COMPANY; 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, by an Order duly made and entered on the 27th 
day of May, 1982 by the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Utah, Central Division, the Honorable Ralph R. 
Mabey, U. S. Bankruptcy Judge presiding, in proceedings then 
pending in said court entitled "In rat LeMel Corporation, 
Debtor" No. 80-00755, NACM Intermountain, in its capacity as 
Trustee of the estate in Bankruptcy of LeMel Corporation, was 
duly authorised and empowered to convey all of the right, title 
and Interest of LeMel Corporation, the Debtor, and all right,v 
title and interest of the estate of the Debtor in the real 
property hereinafter described to General Brewing Companyi *4, 
and said court having determined that the requirements of Notice 
and hearing under Section 11 U.S.C. 5363(b) have been met; 
NOW, THEREFORE,* NACM Intermountain, in its capacity aa 
Trustee of tha'aetata Of LeMel Corporation, by virtue of the
 k 
power and authoritywJJ\ it,vested aa aforesaid, and in considers* 
tion of the SXM of Ten and no/100 Dollars ($10.00) and other, 
«. ^  ' 
valuable consideration to it in hand paid by General Brewing \ 
Company, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged! doea Arab] 
quit~claia and convey unto tha said .General Brewing Company, *uv 
- . • ' . . . . - • * * * ; * **«!*\ 
all of the right, title and interest of LeMel Corporation tad J 
v
 .** , ' *'• * V •- ' • ^  " < - ^ ' ' <n r 
all of the right,, title and interest of tha aatata in 'bankruptcy 
.* * ' l"%l , *"V • *?'" * .- •* f^ 
of U**el Corporation, in and to that certain real property v vX' 
situate, lying and being in the County of Salt Lake, State of \* 
Bteh*> aubiact to two leases* each for a term of veers* certain 
month-to-month tenanciaa, and certain intaraats, rights of 
way and *aaemanta haralnaftar deacrib:J. but othcrviee free 
and claar of all llcna and other inrereita, mora particularly 
daacribad aa followa to wits 
PktCZL MQ. it 
All of Block *39 flat -C-, Salt Ukt City Survey 
PARCEL gQ, Zi 
Beginning at tht Nortbeaat cornar of Lot 6, Block *3. Flat 
"C", Silt Lake City Survey and running thancc Fift * faatf 
thtnea South 660 faat; thence Vtat * fatt to tha Southeaat 
corntr of Lot 1 of aald Block 43; thanca Worth 660 faat 
to tha point of beginning. 
fABCEL 10. \l 
Beginning at tha Southvert corner of aald Block *3» And 
running thenca Veat 99 <~%et; thanca North 2*7.5 feat; thanca 
Veat 163 faat , tore or leae, to tha Eaat bank of tha Jordan 
River; thenoa Northerly along aald Eaat bank to a point 
due Veat froa tha lorthweat oornar of aald Block *3» thanca 
Caat to tha fforthtteat corner of aald Block *3; thenoa South 
660 feet to tha point of beginning. 
All of the South half of vacated Flrat South Street lying 
between the Veat l ine of Olendale Street produced and tha 
Caat Bank of tha Jordan River. 
PARCH. BO. 3t 
Coantnolng at tha Southwest oornar of Slook M , Plat mC*9 
ialt Lake City Survey, and running thence North to roda; 
thenoe Eaat 10 roda: thanoe South 10 roda; thence Veat 
10 roda to the point of beginning. 
fAtm BO, pi 
a l l of Lot 3, Blook 1, JONES SUBDIVISION of Blook 5», Plat E 
•C#, Salt Uka City Surrey. R, 
Together with tha eaat half of vaca%ed Olendale Straat 8 
adjoining on tha Vast. g 
8 
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mau.-tto.JLi 
Al l of Lota 1 and 2 3 . Hook t t JOfttS 3UBDIT13I0I of Block $a# f l a t mC9> Salt Lake City Surtey. 
Together with tho f o l l o w i n g d escr ib ed port ion of vacated 
01en4ale 3 tr<e t a d j o i n i n g on the E a a t | CoBeeno in t 6 2 . 5 
f a a t Worth fro» the Southaaat oorner of Lot 1, * i o ° * *t 
aald JONES SLBOIfISIOM, and running thanca Worth tf/ faa t 
t o tha K o r t h e j a t o o r m r of aald Lc . 23; thanca Caat 33 
f a a t ; thanca South 3 i * « 2 l Veat 5 9 . * * f « « t t o tha p o i n t 
of ooeeanotBant. 
T o f a t h a r with tha Korth o n e - h a l f of tacatad F i r s t South 
Str tat adjoining on tha South. 
PARCEL NO. 8 ; 
Th<s following deacribed portion of vacated First South 
Street being the South one-half of vacated Firat South 
Street lying between the Weat line of 1100 Weat Street 
and the Weat line of Clendale Street produced acroaa First 
South Streets Beginning at a point 66.045 feet South of 
the Northwest Corner of 1100 West and 100 South, which 
corner is als.i the Southaaat Corner of Lot 1, Block 54, 
Plat "C*, Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence 
South 66.045 feet; thence Weat 330.0 feet; thence North 
66.045 feet; thence East 330.0 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
PARCEL NO. 9: 
The fol lowing descrl. ied portion of vacated Glerdale Streets 
Beoinning at the Soiv.heast corner of Lot 1, Block 2, Jonea 
Subdivision of Block 54, P la t •C". S a l : Laka C t y Survey 
and running thence Ncrth 82.5 f e e t ; thance Noz ' 33* 42' 
Eaat 59.48 f e e t ; thence South 132.0 f ea t thenci Weat 33 
f e e t to tha point of beginning. 
Together with the North one-half of vacated F i r s t South 
Stree t adjoining on the South. 
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING RXOffTg OF WAY AND tASEKENTS AND XNTERISTSI 
1. 
09 
to 
Right of *ay for a lUUroad apur t r e o t , aald right of way 
being 6 • 91 f e e t on eaoh a id* of , and aeaaured at r i g h t 
anglea t c , tha fc i lowirg deacribed center Una: 
BEGIMM: jO at a po int Veav. 411 .5 faa t f ro* tha Southweat 
corner ./ tha In teraec t ior - of 10th Vaat S traat and Flrat 
South S t r a a t , running therce Southarly on a 15 #30 f curva 
to th r i r h t a d i s t a n c e of 97 .6 f a a t ; thanca S o u t h e r l y 
on a c a n c t n t to aa ld c u r / t 142.8 f e a t ; thanca on a W 
curv* to tha l e f t 172.2 f e i t to a point on tha Vtst l i t , , 
of 10 h Vest S t r e e t which point i s North 113-3 feat froa 
tha >K.-th l ine of Second South S t r e e t ; ib t r e a t e d in favor 
of i t * Western P a c i f i c Railroad Coapany. a c o r p o r a t i o n , 
by inairuBent recorded June 27, 1921 aa Entry !fo. 452855 
in Bool 11-1 at page 81. 
By Agrttment recorded September 9 t 1925, Entry Mo. 5*2833 
in Book 3-V, page 5*3. aald Veatern Paci f ic Railroad Company 
g r a n t e e an e a a e a e n t and r i f ,ht -of -way over a port ion of 
above dcecribed tract to Ore^a Short Una Railroad Company. 
An Agreement a f fac t ln9 thia and othar property, racordad 
September 9, 1925 at Entry Mo. 5*283* in Book 3-W, page 
3 3 8 , by and between Oregon Short t l n a **llro*d Co., and 
Tha W«»t«rn Paci f ic Railroad Co., Plrat Part lea , and Tlahar 
Terminal Varehouae Co . , a corporation, Sacond Party, which 
tt°V?!,!{0P r « l o c a t i 0 0 of Prt i tnt trackaga and conatruction 
or a d d i t i o n a l trackaga In accordance with a p l a t aarkad 
Schedule "A", attached there to . 
A P a r p a t u a l Eaaaaent for tha t o l a and e x c l u a i v e uee of 
Oregon Short Una Railroad Company, and tha Veatera P a c i f i o 
R a i l r o a d Company, for a r i g h t of way for t h e i r P r « " Q t 
apur tracka over tha following land , t o - w l t : An i r ™ « u l e r 
t r i c t of land baing a part of Lot 6 , Block 43* f i * t C , 
Salt Laka City Survey, and thoaa certa in portiona of vacated 
r irat South Straat (togathar with othar proparty not covered 
by thia report ) , mora p a r t i c u i a r y dcaoribed in i « * * r u * # ° * 
racordad January 2 0 , 1926, aa Entry Ho. 55>6S2 in Book 
3-X of Liana and Laaaas, at page 252. 
15 f a a t South of tha Cantar U n a t h e r e o f , to the Jordan 
River , aa c r e a t e d in favo* of Otah Oaa * C o * * C o * / , \ n , * l 
by inatruaant raoorded July 27 , 19*9 »• Kotry Bo. 637166 
in Book 44 at page 569 of 0?;r}olal Racorda. 
A Pole l i n e Eaieaant ©ve* t h e f o l l o w i n g deacr lbed oenter 
l ine s 
B e g i n n i n g at a p o i n t South 69'%?'<6t22« f e e t ' 70 f e e t froa 
a Rtnuaeot at tha ln teraect lon of r i r a t South an* Clendale 
S t . ' e e t a , and running thence South OM2'22* Veet 51 f e e t ; 
thence North 69*5tt'22* Eaat 436.6 faa t . aa created In favor 
of Otah Tower 4 Light Coapany, a corporation, by Inatruaant 
recorded Autuat 2 3 , 1945, ao Entry Vo. 1009067 *n Book 
4*4 at page 609 of Of f lo la l Racorda. 
- 4 -
7. 
11A4I 
k Ri4bt of ** for a 3 l*c* « U r pipeline A1"M the foUsvin* dticrlUd 
"4 BodinlAi at a point South « * feet aad Aft U36 feet fro. t*e * ^ T " i — aanJtfSect loi 2t Tt^ihlp 1 South, Rat** 1 Net, «alt lato Baaa 4 K«**M • * 
£mi*g thence South tf 20- iaat 155 f t t l t h « a Soutt 2? *>• *at • * / • * • " 
disclosed ty Certificate of Appropriation of flater, revcrded Haj W0 t •• " " 7 
No. 123U02 In Book 76*, pe<e * * of Official lecarda. 
Suppleoental Agreeoent for aalntananca and optratlon or 
"raclcaga aervlng the f isher Brewing Company dated March 
II, I960, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Coopany, 
and Th« Western Pacific Railroad Company, recorded Deceaber 
21, I960, aa Entry No. 1752826 In Book 1767 at page 145 
of Official Recorda. 
10. Eaaeaent for pole l laea and incidental purpoaea aa created 
in favor of Utah Power 4 Light Coapany by inatruaent recorded 
January 16, 1961» aa Entry No. 1756733 to Book 1773 at 
page 242 of Official Recorda, over tha following daaoribad 
Una: 
Beginning at a point within an e i ia t ing tranaalaaion Una 
which la 900 faat South and 1135.0 feat Eaat, aora or l a t a , 
froa tha Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, 
Rnaae 1 Veat, Salt Lake Baaa and Meridian, thenoe South 
06M9V Vest 5*0 faat on aald land ard being in Lota 3 and 
6, of aald Seotion 2. 
11. Eaaement for pola l i t e a and Incidental purposed aa created 
in ftror of Utah Power A Light Coapany by inatruaent recorded 
January 16, 1961, at Entry No, 175673* 1« Boo* 1*73 at 
page 24j of Offlolal Recorda over the following described 
l ine: 
Beginning at a point at a fence on tha North boundary line 
of the aald land at a point B4S.0 faat South and 1170.0 
feet East, aora or l e s s , froa tha Borthweet corner of Section 
2, Township 1 South, Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake Baaa and Herid 1 en. 
thenoe South 0*0«« Saat 740.00 faat aore or laaV. t o a 
f j ° £ e . ° a " • J 0 " * J j » " w r ***• of • • !< l u a and being 
in Lota ) and 6 of aald Seotion I. 5 
Co 
12. Eaaeaent for u t i l i t i e s and incidental purpoaea over and *~ 
! o r o »« **• Ureal No. 2 aa rtaerved in favor of Salt Lake P 
N o ^ l S ^ ^ l / i 1 1 ! S o l r t 0 0 r d f < ^B»bap H. lora?Va r i t r j L No. 1563556 in Book 1995 a t page 191 ot O f f i c i a l fl?corda. O? 
c5 
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13. The interest if aor. of Tss testers fttifis Bsilroed Co* pan jr. 
a Delaware Corserstloe, sstuirsd under and by virtus of 
too Corporate Warranty Dee a fro* Tss Vsstsra Pacific Railroad 
Coaeany, a California Corporation dated Nareh 21, 1971 
tod roeorded oa April *, 1979 *• latry so. 3259900 lo ftort 
• 839 at pais Til of Offloial leeords, of the following 
traots 
The Worth 1/2 of vacated First South Street adjoining Lot 
1- Block 2, Joaca Subdivision oa ths South tbsrcof. Also, 
all or ths South cn**nalf of vacated First South Strsst 
lying betvetn tDc Htt: line of Oleedale Street produced 
anl the £&>t S'.Q;? of the Jordan River. Alto, the Cast 
1/2 of vacated Gler.dtle Strset which abutt* on ths Vast 
tide of Lot 3, IXA<*C.\ 1, Jones Subdivision (of Slock 5*, 
riat § C e ( a&it LtJ;e City Survey.) Also, Beginning 82.5 
feat rtorth froo tho Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 2, 
Jones Subdlvltilon, en&~running thsnee Vorth 19*5 fsst to 
ths Jorthsast comer of Lot 23, of said Sutdlvlalon; times 
Cast 33 fsst; thtntu South 33•*1* Wast S9.*8 fsst to ths 
polut of bs|loolof 
Ths intsrsst if any, of the Crocker National Bank, a National 
Banking Association, ct al., acquired under and by virtue 
of the Second Supplemental Indenture dated April I, 1979 
and recorded April a, 1979 as Entry No. 3259802 in Book 
"839 *t page 711 of Official Records, of ths saas tracts 
dsscrlbsd undsr Itea Mo. 11 hereof. 
The rights of Salt Lake City Corporation in the property 
described in Parcels 8 and 9, including the right co reopen 
those portions of vacated First South Street and Glendale 
Street described therein. 
Any other rights of way and easements for roads, ditches, 
cana* ', utilities pipelines, etc., which may exist ever, 
under or across said land. 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular the earns premises 
with the appurtenances thereto unto th* said Ceneral Brewing 
Company, its successors and assigns forever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, NACM 1NTXW40UNTMN, as such Trustee, 
has hereunto set its hand and seal the day and year first above 
written. 
HACK INTERMOUNTAIN 
By cS%^&r-^ 
Executive Vice-Precidsnt, 
Secretary- Kan«.g#r 
-6-
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NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
3334045 
NOTICF IS HEREBY GIVEN: That KICHAKD L. BLANCK IS 
Trustee under a Deed of Tr;jst dated Ouiy 6, 1977, executed by 
LeM<il Corporation, a Utah corporation, Melvin E. Ingersoll and 
Beverly Ingersoll, his wife. Leland R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E. 
Ingersoll, his wife, in which General Brewing Company, L 
California corporation, is named as Beneficiary and Backman 
Abstract t Title Company is named as Trustee, recorded July 18, 
1977, as Entry No. 2971310, in Book 4519, at Page 1159, of 
Official Records in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt 
Laxe County, Utah, describing land therein as: 
SEE ArTACKMENT 
Said obligations include a note in the principal sum of 
$1,800,000.00. 
A breach of, and default in, the obligations for which 
such deed :.s security has occurred in that payments due on August 
1, 1979 and September 1, 1979, in the total amount of §55,316.66, 
have not beed paid. 
By reason of such default, Richard L. Blanck, as 
Trustee, and General Brewing Company, as Beneficiary, under said 
Deed of Trust, do hereby declare all sums secured thereby iivme-
diately due and payable and have elected and do hereby elect to 
cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations 
secured thereby. 
DATED this 7€h day of September. 
RICHARD L. BLANCK, Trustee 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this 7th day of September, personally appeared betore 
me Richard L. Blanck, as Trustee in the foregoing Notice ot 
Defau.1*,, whp duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
. v. .:.;; . 
.' '"VOTA/jyA . \ \JtjAfrj\£Ms*J 
:
 ' ; * • - J- NOTARY PUBLIC 
\ ^ U B L ^ Vesiding *n Sa l t Laxe County. Utah 
«y**^TTTjr.iajiion ^Expires: 
By Agreement recorded September 9, 1925, Entry No. 542633 in Book 3-V, 
page 573, said Western Pacific Railroad Company granted an easement and 
right-of-way over a portion of above described tract to Oregon Short 
Line Railroad Company. 
3. An Agreement recorded September 9, 1925 as Entry Ho. 542834 in BooV 3-W, 
page 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. and The Western 
Pacific Railroad Co. flrat partiea, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., a 
corporation, second party, vhlch provides for relocation of present 
trackage and construction of additional trackage in accordance with a 
plat narked Schedule "A" attached thereto. 
4. A perpetual easeaent for the sole and exclusive use of Oregon Short Line 
Railroad Coapany and the Western Pacific Railroad Company for a Right of 
Way for their present spur tracke over the following described land, to wit: 
An irregular tract of land, being a part of Lot 6, Block 43, 
Plat "CM, Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain portions 
of vacated First South Street (together vlth other property 
not covered by this deed) more particularly described in 
instrument retarded January 20, 1926 as 1'ntry No. 551852 in 
Book 3 X of Liens and Leases, page 252. 
5. A Right of Way for the purpose of laying, aalntalning, operating and removal 
of a gas pipe line along the following described line.: 
BECINNINC at the West line of 10th West Street, and running 
West on First South Street, 15 feet Sovth of the center line 
thereof, to the Jordan River; as created in favor of Utah Cas 
4 Coke Coapany by instrument recorded July 27, 1949, as Entry 
Mo. 637186 in Book 44, Par.*. 5B9 of Official Records. 
6. A Pol? Line Easeaent over the following described enter line: 
BECINNINC at a point South 69*58V22M West 470 feet 
froa a Monument at the intersection of Flrat South 
and Clendale Streets, and running thence South 0*12'22" 
West 51 feet; thence North 89*58,22" East 436.8 feet; 
as created in favor of Utah Power and Light Coapany, a 
corporation, by instrument recorded August 23, 1945, as 
Entry Mo. 1009087 in Book 434,'1'age * 0 9 of Official 
Records. 
7. A Right of Vay for a 3 Inch water pipeline along the following described 
line: 
BECINNINC at a point South 1236 feet and East 1136 feet 
froa the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence South 63*10' East 155 feet; thence South 25*30* 
East 65 feet, as disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation 
of Water, recorded May 25, 1950, as Entry No. 1201402 in 
Book 766, Page 266 of Official Records. 
6. A perpetual easeaent for a drainage ditch along the North aide of West 
First South Street, together vlth the right of the City to enlarge aald 
ditch, as reserved by Salt Lake City in instrument recorded September 22, 
1925, as Entry No. 543644 in Book 12-B, page 524 of Official Records. 
9. A Pole Line Easeaent granted to Utah Power 4 Light Coapany as recorded 
January 16, 1961, in Book 1773, Page 242, Entry No. 1756733, Official 
Records, for the erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, 
and replacement of the electric transmission distribution and telephone 
circuits of the Crantee and tvo anchori. and three poles along a line 
described as follows: 
BECJKNINC at • point within an existing transmission Una which 
is 900 faat Ssuth and 1139 feet East, aore or less, froa 
the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 6*49* West 540 fast 
on aald land and being In Lota 3 and 6 of atld Section 2. 
A role Lina Easeaent granted to Utah Fewer I Light Coapeny as racordtd 
January 16, 1961, in Book 1773. Fage 243, Entry No. 1756734, Official 
ftecordt, for the aractioo and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, 
and replacement of the electric transmission distribution and telephone 
circuits of the Grantee and one guy and 3 poles along a line described as 
follows: 
2&C1NN1NC at a fence en the Worth boundary line of the Cr an tors* 
land at a point SA5 feet South and 117C feet East, more or lets, 
froa the Northwest corner of Section 2, Tov-nshlp 1 South, ftange 
1 Vest, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 0*02* East 740 feet. 
aore or less, to a fence cm the South boundary line of said land 
and being In Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2. 
Any other rights of way and easeaeats for roads, ditches, canals, utiliti 
pipe lines, etc., which a»y exist over, under or serosa said land. 
I * CO 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
I SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
0:1
 t n
*
 3 r d
 day of June, 1982, personally appeared 
before me, Robert H. Cleiidenen, who being by me duly sworn 
did say, that he, the said Robert H. Clendenen, is the 
Executive Vice-President, Secretary-Manager of KACM XnteriTOuntein, 
and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in 
behalf c" said corporation by Authority of A reoolution of 
Its board of directors and was signed by said corporation in 
its officisl cApAcity AS Trustee of the estste of LeMel 
Corporation by virtue of the power invested in it as such 
Trustee. 
T73TAKY PUBLIC, Residing at 
r0</N Salt-. Lake City, Utah 
^f^^pmafc^ssion Expires t 
6/26/84 
B 
•• ^ 
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Exhibit I 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: 
interstate Land Corporation 
.9:10 South 5200 Uest 
West Jordan, Utah 94084 
&M& 6 SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
I«i ,••- 00 
GENERAL BREWING COMPANY, a corporation ^rgnriied and 
existing under the laws of the State of California, with its principal 
office at 79 St. Thomas Way, Tib'iron, California, hereby conveys and 
warrants against all claims by, through or under GRANTOR to 
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION. GRANTEE, for the sum of Ten and 
no/100 Dollars (S10.00) and other good and valuable consideration the 
tract of land in Salt Lake County, "tah, described on Exhibit "A" which 
is at ached hereto. 
THE OFFICER who signs this deed hereby certifies that this 
deed and the transfer represented thereby was duly authorizes under a 
resolution duly adopted by the Board of Directors of the GRANTOR at a 
lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the GRANTOR has caused its corporate 
name and seal to be hereunto aifixed by its duly authorized officer this 
TtL day of ^MJUUAJ^ . 1984. 
GENERAL BREWING COMPANY 
CAt\ 
PRESIDENT 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
COUNTY OF CLAPK ) 
On the 7th day of February , 19f,4, personally appeared' 
before me CARL E. MULLEN, JR., being by me duly sworn, did «ay that 
he, the said CARL E. MULLEN. JR.. is the President of the General 
Brewing Company, and that the within and foregoing instrument was 
signed on behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its 
Board of Directors and said CARL £. MULLEN. JR.. duly acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed 
is the seal of said corporation. 
W0TMY jrofcfgfln in$1or'*th7k\*\« 
WashingtoTi, residing at Vancouver 
H 
flKEL IQ> U 
All of Block 13. Plat *C-, Stlt Ukt City Survty 
fktCIL BO. 2t 
Btglnnlng i t tht North**%t eorntr of Lot 8, Block *3, Plat 
"C", Salt Lakt City Survey and running thtnet Cast * f t t t ; 
thtnet South 660 f t t t j thtnet Vtat * f t t t to tht Southtaat 
eorntr of Lot 1 of said Block A3; thtnet North 660 f t t t 
to tht point of btglnnlng. 
MUCH TO, M 
BtglBolRi at tht Southwtit eorntr of said Block *3 , and 
out n i t i r o i vot nsrinwui eorntr ox 111a DIOCK •» 3; intnct 
Eatt to tht Northvtat eorntr of said Block *3; thtr.ee South 
660 f t t t to tht point of btglnnlng. 
f l t e n *0. At 
All of tht South half of vaeattd Plrat South Strttt lying 
bttvtta tht Vtat lint of Cltndalt Strttt pr.duetd and tht 
Cast Bank of tht Jordan Blvtr. 
PUCEL 10. %\ 
Conttnerng at tht Southvtat eorntr of Block u , plat " C , 
Salt Lakt City Survty. and running thtnet North 10 rods; 
„hanct Caat 10 roda: thtnet South 10 rods; thtnet Vttt 
10 rod* to tht point of btglnnlng. 
fAnm 13. fil 
• 11 of Lot 3. Block 1, JOKES SUBDIVISION of Block SA, f l i ; 
•C% Salt Lakt City Survty. 
Togt t ! i t r with t h t taa t half of vaeattd Cltndalt S t r t t t 
tdJoining on tht Vtat. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
•-!• 
n f i f t i ia . Tt 
i ^ of Lett 1 ted 23, Hook 2, 4C1E3 SUltlvi'XOW of Bl*eV 
5*, f la t « C \ Salt Ukt City Survey. 
\ * | t t h t r «rlth tht following dascribed portion of vactttd 
• tndt l t S t * t t t td jo ln lnf on tht East; Ccsjaeneinf 6 2 . 1 
f t t t Horth from tht Southeast eorntr of Lot 1, Block 2, 
atid JOKES SUBDXfXSIOM, and runnlnf thtnce forth 66 f t t t 
t o t h t Northeast oorntr of t t l d l o t 23* '•'tnea Etst 33 
fteO; thence South 33 # *2' Vttt 59.*8 f t « t :o th t po in t 
of aottaV^neta* «t . 
T o f t t h t ^ rfitrt tht Worth ont-hal f of v tc t t ed Firat South 
S tr t t t tdjctnlnf oo tht South. 
/ 
FAE'CL NO. 3t 
* Tht following dttcribtd portion of vactttd First South 
Street being tht South ont-htlf of vajattd Firat South 
Strttt Ikying between tht Watt lint of 1100 Wtat Street 
and tht west line of Gltndalt Strtet produced across First 
Scjth Street: Beginning at a point 66.045 feet South of 
the Northwest Corner of 1100 West and 100 South* which 
ccrnsr it also tne Southeast Corner of Lot 1, Block 54, 
Flat *C". Salt eke City Survey, and running thence 
SoutJt 66.045 ftt ; ihence Wf-st 330.0 feet: thence North 
66.C45 feet; thence East 330.0 feet to tne point of 
beginning. 
PAJ.CEL NO. 91 
Tht following described portion of vacated Glendale Strttt: 
Btginning tt tht Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 2, Jones 
Subdivision of Block 54, Vlat *C", Salt Lake City Survey 
and running thtnet North 02.5 fttt: thenct North 33* 42' 
East 59.48 fttt? thenct South 132.0 f«et thtnet West 33 
fttt to tht point of baoinning, 
Togtthtr with tht North one-half of vactttd First South 
Strttt adjoining on the 5outh. 
SUBJECT TO TBI FOLLOWING FlGliyS OF WAV AND EASEKTNTS AND XNTERTSTS: 
" i! 'S"I\^ KBK75 
•3-
Bight of Way for t Railroad spur tract, said right of way 
btlng 6 1/2 fttt on ttch slCa of, tnd atisurtd at right 
unfits to, tht following dtacrlbtd etnttr lint: 
B E G I M U R G it a point Wtst *11. 5 fttt froa tht Southeast 
eorntr of tht lottrstctlon of 10th Vtst Strttt tnd First 
South Strttt, running thtnet Southtrly on a 15•30• curvt 
to tht right a dlstanet of 97.6 ftet; thtnet Southtrly 
00 a tangant to aald curvt 112.6 fttt; thtnet on a ia* 
C r r ? « A ° u l M l.tft l 7 2' 2 f # t t t 0 • Polnt'on tnt Vtst lint 
?f l?11*.**!!1 S l r V l " h l c h > o l n t *» K« r^h 113.3 fttt fro. 
•V/a?I w . U ° A - 0 f . S t ? ^ d S.° U t, h S t r i t t J •• crtattd In favor 
of tha Vtsttrn Pacific Railroad Coapany, a corporation, )i sScr^ n v;Vt°«a d ;? . J u n t "•,9?1 ts -ntpy K ° - i5285i 
!/r itr^\mlnt ^•co i^,d•' , Stpttabtr 9, 1925, Entry Ko. 5*2833 
ll.f?~J ' p t | t 5 3# i i l d *•»*•"» Pacific Railroad Coapany 
t r i o t t d an taaaacnt and right-of-way o v t r a portion of 
abova dtacrlbtd tract to Ortgon Short Lint Nllroad Coapany. 
i ! * ? ! ! ! ! ! 9 * " ? ! f t c t l n 9 . t h i i *n d o t h e r P™***^* rtcordtd 
n 8 , by and bttwtan Oragon Short Lint Railroad Co., and 
Tarainal Varahouat Co., a corporation, Stcond Party, which 
trr°"*22iJ*0«*?fl?f:*lton 0 f p r t , t n t trackagt tnd construction 
of addi t ional trackagt m accordanct with a plat airktd S:htdult «A«, attachtd thtrt to . 
A P t r p t t u a l Eaaaaant for tht aol t and t i c l u s i v t uat of 
Ortgon Short Lint Railroad Coapany, and tht Vtsttrn Pac i f i c 
Rai lroad Coapany, for a right of way for thair prtaant 
spur trackf ovar tha following land, t o - w l t : An irraguiar 
tract of land balng a part of Lot 6, Block *3 , Pl»t "C", 
Salt Laka City Surety, and thoat ctrtain portlona of vacatad 
Firat South Straat (togathar with othar proparty not covtrtd 
by thlt raport), aora part leulary daacribtd in lnatruatnt 
recorded January 20 , 1926, aa Entry Ko. 55H52 In Book 
3-X of Liana and Laaata, at pagt 252. 
• A Right of Way for tha purpoai of lay ing , a a l n t a l n l n g , 
oparatlng and raaovlng a gai plpt Una along tht fo l lowing 
dtacrlbtd U n a : Btglnnlog at tht Vaat l i n t of 10th Vast 
S t r a t t , and running thtnet Vast on F i r s t South S t r t t t , 
15 f t t t South of tht Ctnttr l i n t t h t r t o f , to tht Jordan 
Ri?ar. aa crtatad in favor of Utah Gas & Cokt Coapany. 
by lnatruatnt rtcordtd July 2 ' , 19*9 aa Entry Ho. 637186 
la Book M at paga 509 of Official Rteords. 
A Poit H o t Et t ta tn t or tr tht fol lowing dtacrlbtd c tnt tr 
H a t : 
Btg lnnlog at a point South 69*5B>22* Vtat *70 f t t t froa 
a aoouatot at tha la t trate t ioo of f i r a t South and Cltndala 
S t r t t t a , and running thaaat South 0 « i » t t l " Vtat 51 f t t t r 
thtaat Korth 89 , S* , ! t« Cast *3*M f««% •• artattd in favar 
of Otah Powar A Light Coapaay, a vorsoration. by lnatruatnt 
rtcordtd Auiuat 13. 1M5, •* **tr~ Br. 106felT in Boat 
*3* i t paga 609 of Off iaUl Rttorda. 
7. A *!*% af * y f* a 3 i~* - t * ' JAP***" *<*" « - ******** * * " r t * 4 
Uaat 
eo^eTofSactlon 2, Township 1 South, 1U,4* 1 Bet, ***&*,.**"* * ? £ £ ' > 
£ £ £ * thtact South «FlO« Utt 155 f t t i thane feuth 25° 30- East 15 fttt. 
dlaclofad toy Certificate of Appropriation of Water, recorded Kay 1950. at totry 
Ho. 120U02 la Book 7*«, ***• 266 of Official. Beeorda. 
A Ferpetuai easeotnt for a drainage ditch along the Berth 
aida of Wast Firs t South S t r e e t , together w:th tha right 
of the City to enlarge said d i t ch , as reserved by Sal t 
Lake City, in instrument recorded Septaabtr 22, 1925 ae 
Entry Bo. 5*36** in Book 12-H, paga 52* cT Official Records. 
Supplemental Agreement for maintenance and operation of 
trackage serving the Fisher Brewing Company dated March 
11, I960, by and betwaeo Oregon Short tine Railroad Company, 
and Tha Vastern Pacific Railroad Company, recorded December 
21 I960, as Entry Ko. 1752626 In Book 176? at page 1*5 
of Official Records. 
10. Easement for pola l i o n ar.d Incidental purposes as created 
In favor of Otah Fowar 4 Light Company by Instrument recorded 
January 16, 1961, as Entry No. 1756733 in Book 1773 s t 
page 242 of Official Records, ovar tha fol lowing described 
Una: 
Beginning at § point within an e x i s t i n g transmission Una 
which la 900 feat Soutl and 1135.0 feet Eaat, mora or l a s s , 
from tha Borthweat corner of Section 2, Townahlp 1 South, 
Rnace 1 Vast, Salt Laka Base and Marldlan, ther.co South 
06 # «9' Vaati5*0 feat on aald land and being In Lots 3 and 
6, of said Section 2. 
11. Eaeemant for polo l lnae ard inc identa l purposed as creftad 
In favor of Otah Fowar A Llg.it Company by instrument recorded 
January 16, 1961» as Ent"y Bo. 175673* in Book 1*73 i t 
page 2*3 of Official Records ovar tha fol lowing daaeribad 
Una: 
Beginning at a point at a fance on tha Borth boundary l loe 
of tha said land at a point 0*3.0 feat South and 1170.0 
feat Eaat, mora or l eas , from tha Borthwast corner of Section 2L T o w i l f * l B 1 *o»*h, Range 1 Baat, Salt Lake Base and Karidiaa. 
thence South 0*02 f Eaat 7*0.00 feat mora or l a s s , to a 
fanoa oa tha South boundary Una of aald land and being 
in Lota 3 and 6 of maid Section 2. 
U # Caaamamt for u t i l i t i e s and Incidental purposts ovar and 
aeroaa the Faroel Fo. t aa rertrvad in favor of Salt Lake 
S117 ,!1 .*..^*1! C 1 , 1 S *!!2 FtmoKtd tecamber 17, 1 |6 | as Entry 
Bo. 1988556 in Book 1998 at »§«• 191 of Official /taeorde. 
• 5-
The Interest If any, of The V«st«ra Feeifie Jellroed Company, 
• O i l i v i n Corporation, acquired uodar 4nd by U r t u t of 
the Corporate Varraoty Deed froa The Veetero Faclflc Railroad 
Coapany, a California Corporation, dated Hareh 29. 1979 
and recorded oa April *9 1979 aa Entry *o. 3239000 1« Book 
•839 at page 718 of Off lo la l Records, of tba f o l l o v i o g 
t.racta 
1 
Tba forth 1/2 of vaoated Flrat South Jtreet adjoining Lot 
1, Bloc'i 2, Joaes Subdivision ao tba South tbaraof. Aiao, 
a l l of iha South ©ae-half of vacated f l r a t South S t r t t t 
l y l e t between tha Vtkt I lea of Qlaadala Straat produead 
and th t faa t Bank of tha Jordan Biver. l l s o , tha t t s t 
1/2 of vacated Qlaadala Straat which abuttf oa tha Vast 
Blda of Lot 3* Blook 1, Joaaa Subdivision (of Block 5*, 
Flat *C*# Sal t Laka Cl.y Survey.) Alto , Beginning 8 2 . 3 
f a a t forth froa tha Southaatt co air of Lot 1, Block 2, 
Joaai Subdivis ion, aniTruaalBC thaset.Worth 89.5 f tat to 
tha Bortheast toraar of Lot 23, of tald Subdivision; thence 
Cait S3 faat ; thaata South 33**2' Vest 59.88 faat to tht 
polet of beginning. 
Tha lntarast If any, •. t>e Crockar Nitior.al Bank, a National 
Banking Association, n a l . t acquired under and by v ir tue 
cf tha Second Supplemental Indenture dated Aaril *. 1979 
and recorded April 8, 1970
 a 9 Entry No. 3259802 In Book 
8B39 at page 711 of Of f i c ia l Records, of the saoe tracts 
described under Itea No. 11 hereof. 
Tha rights of Salt Laka City Corporation in the property 
described in Parcala 8 and 9, including the right to reopen 
thoae portiona cf vacated First South Street and Clendale 
Street described therein. 
Any *ther rights of way and easements for roads, d i tches , 
canals, u t i l i t i e s , p ipel ines , e t c . , which may exis t over, 
under or acroaa aaid land. 
Subje:t to rights of tenants in poraesaio.i. 
) APR 23 1986 State of Utah bounty ot Soil Lake 
* ' ! • ' - • » . • « • • ? » " . • • r 
L ' f - i - v 
Exhibit J 
WHEN-^ECpi S * * 
0555782 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
( CO*l»0* ATI*. I OR M ] 
S|M»<* Abtn-t* fortiJr«»r4rr j.U»»* j c **~"S 
LEMEL CORPORATION , a corporation 
organized *nd existing under the lawi of the State of Utah, with its principal office at 
S a l t Lake C i t y , of County of S a l t Lake . State of Utah, 
grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to 
R.D. PATTERSON 
grantee 
for the sum of 
— DOLLARS. 
County, 
of S a l t Lake County 
Ten and n o / 1 0 0 
and other good and valuable considerations 
the following described tract of land in Salt Lake 
State of Utah: 
The West half of Glendale and South half of 
First South Streets, went of 1100 West in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, as vacated by the 
City of Salt Lake by an ordinance passed 
by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
City. Utah on the 5th day of October, 1977 
and published on the 15th day of October, 
1977, the entirety of said Glendale and 
First South Streets west of 1100 West being 
more particularly described as follows: 
(See Schedule "A" attached) 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented 
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed 
by its duly authorized officers this 2 7 t h day of J u l y , A. D. 1979 
Attest: 
[tOUPORATE SEAL] 
STATK OY UTAH, 
County of S a l t Lake 
On the 27 t h day of J u l y 
personally appeared before me MELVIN E . INGERSOLL and 
who being by me d«ily sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said KELVIN E . INGEP.SOLL 
is the president, and he, the said \% l n c secretary 
of LEMEL CORPORATION Company, and that the within jnd foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of 
director* and said y^lVIN E. INGERSOLL and 
each duly acknowled^u to me that said corporation executed the same and thajt the seal affixed 
is the *c*\ of said corporation. . • 
i l 
A. D. 
%rfLe£*~7'__ 
tv owmisMim ..r*4^^_M, „„„„, ,^^-yS2r^^x 
M «OJC- OWIT CLAIM OtCO. C O « * r o ^ W - . n ... co 
APPROVED f OftM - UTAH SECURITIES C O M A - I S S I O * 
SCHEDULE "A' 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 1, 
Block I, JONES' SUBDIVISION, Block 54, Plat 
"C" Salt Lake City Survey, said point also 
being the Northwest corner of 1100 West and 
First South Streets; and running thence South 
0*2'53M East 132.17 feet; thence West 334.00 
feet; thence North 0#00'55M West 214.63 feet 
to the Northeast corner of Lot 1, Block 2, 
said JONES' SUBDIVISION; thence North 33*42* 
East 59.48 feet; thence East 36.00 feet to 
the Northwest corner of Lot 2, Block 1, said 
JONES' SUBDIVISION; thence South 132.00 feet; 
thence East 264.00 feet to the point of beg-
inning. 
Stato of Utah j 
Co-.in!y of San tak 3 1 
I. the undersigned. Recorder of Sa'l Lake County. 
Utafi eo hcv^by ce/tiry ifta* by Jew I hsve Mi* ojw&y 
of a scfil ?.v.ci ?..'• p a w s tJoc'Jwepfs. record*,
 t r d otner 
«fiJ :'i«s: i«'ii ? <i6.\ej C'-J ."«.••:•;•.•:/»£ •$ S. Jrus arte •<#«.' 
ApHnc**-•«., , -'••--•• • • ' -M« i .c» .Hee ler 
- i - ^ _ ^ . ^ , , 0 ; _ ^ 1 ^ ««• . ' .«* , UWi 
Exhibit K 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY ^ - r > -^ ^ 3 b 
P a t r i c k J . O 'Hara ...
 VJ„ 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f I n t e r s t a t e Land ?^&AMii 
Corporation """~^ 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO INTERVENE FILED BY 
MELVIN E. INGERSOLL, MARIAN 
BEVERLY INGERSOLL, LELAND R. 
INGERSOLL, AND EVELYN E. 
INGERSOLL 
Civil No. C-85-0790 
Judge Phillip R. Fishier 
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff 
Interstate Land Corporation ("Interstate") against defendant 
R.D. Patterson ("Patterson") came on regularly for hearing 
Monday, May 5, 1986. The Court's ruling on InterstateTs motion 
for summary judgment is in a separate order. The motion for 
permission to file a complaint in intervention filed by 
proposed plaintiffs in intervention, Melvin E. Ingersoll, 
Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E. 
Ingersoll (herein the "Ingersolls") also came on regularly for 
hearing at that time. Interstate was represented by Patrick J. 
O'Hara. Patterson was represented by Ralph J. Hafen. The 
Ingersolls were represented by Ronald C. Barker. The Honorable 
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION, ) 
a 
R 
Utah 
D. 
corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
PATTERSON, ) 
Defendant. ) 
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Phillip R. Fishier was presiding. After hearing the arguments 
of counsel, the Court took the motion under advisement. After 
fully considering the arguments of counsel and all relevant 
papers filed by parties with the Court, and for good cause 
shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Motion to file a complaint in intervention 
filed by the Ingersolls is hereby denied. 
ENTERED 
BY THE COURT: 
ixsujLJLS J.5 iieieuy ueuieu. 
this ^ day of J ^ ^ t , 1986. 
L 
District Judge Phillip Pu Fishier 
ATTEST 
C r k 
& ^{CkiUJ^-^^^1 <^uty Clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Pursuant to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, the 
undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing proposed form 
of "Order Denying the Motion to Intervene Filed by Melvin E. 
Ingersoll, Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll, and 
Evelyn E. Ingersoll" was served on opposing counsel before 
being presented to the Court for signature. A copy of the 
foregoing proposed Order was served on counsel listed below by 
mail, postage prepaid, this I5T day of August, 1986, and will 
be presented to the Court not prior to the 11 *- day of August, 
1986: 
Ralph J. Hafen 
Attorney for Defendant 
402 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney for Proposed Plaintiffs 
in Intervention Melvin E. Ingersoll, 
Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. 
Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Patrick J. O'Hara 
Attorney for Interstate Land 
Corporation 
47880 
080186 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R. D. PATTERSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST DEFENDANT 
Civil No. C-85-0790 
Judge Phillip R. Fishier 
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff 
Interstate Land Corporation ("Interstate") against defendant 
R.D. Patterson ("Patterson") came on regularly for hearing 
Monday, May 5, 1986. The motion for permission to file a 
complaint in intervention filed by proposed plaintiffs in 
intervention Melvin E. Ingersoll, Marian Beverly Ingersoll, 
Leland R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll (herein the 
"Ingersolls") also came on regularly for hearing at this time. 
The Court's ruling on the Ingersollfs motion to intervene is in 
a separate order. Interstate was represented by Patrick J. 
O'Hara. Patterson was represented by Ralph J. Hafen. The 
Ingersolls were represented by Ronald C. Barker. The Honorable 
Phillip R. Fishier was presiding. After hearing the arguments 
nnnl.49 
of counsel, the Court took the motion under advisement. After 
fully considering the arguments of counsel and all relevant 
papers filed by parties with the Court, and for good cause 
shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Interstatefs Motion for Summary Judgment against 
Patterson, which was filed with the Court on or about April 25, 
1986, is hereby granted. 
2. Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court determines that Interstate is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law because there are no 
material facts in dispute. The Court hereby incorporates by 
reference and adopts as undisputed findings of the Court the 
"Statement of Undisputed Facts" in the "Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment" filed with the 
Court on or about April 25, 1986. 
3. The Court hereby enters summary judgment in favor 
of Interstate against Patterson that Patterson has no right, 
title or interest whatsoever in that certain parcel of real 
property more particularly described in that certain Quit-Claim 
Deed recorded at the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on 
March 11, 1982 at Book 5349, Page 1360 (hereinafter "The 
Patterson Quit-Claim Deed"). 
-2- QOOtS 
4. The Court further enters summary judgment in 
favor of Interstate against Patterson that the parcel of real 
property described in The Patterson Quit-Claim Deed is also the 
same real property described more particularly as Parcel Nos. 8 
and 9 in that certain Special Warranty Deed recorded at the 
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office February 14, 1984 at Book 
5531, Page 545 (hereinafter the "Interstate Special Warranty 
Deed"). 
5. As a matter of law, and based on the undisputed 
documents of record pertaining to said real property, the Court 
hereby enters summary judgment in favor of Interstate that 
Patterson acquired no right, title or interest pursuant to the 
Patterson Quit Claim Deed because, at the time the Patterson 
Quit Claim Deed was executed by the Grantor named therein 
(i.e., LeMel Corporation), the Grantor had no right title or 
interest in the subject property. The Court rules as a matter 
of law that the Grantee, Patterson, acquired under the 
Patterson Quit Claim Deed no more than the Grantor, LeMel 
Corporation, had. The Court further determines as a matter of 
law that as of the date of the purported conveyance LeMel had 
no interest to convey whatsoever in the real property described 
in the Patterson Quit-Claim Deed. 
6. Interstate's motion for summary judgment on the 
issues raised by Patterson's Third, Fourth and Fifth 
affirmative defenses is also granted. 
-3- nnulSl 
7. The Court hereby enters summary judgment in favor 
of Interstate and against Patterson on Patterson's Third 
Affirmative Defense because the Court rules as a matter of law 
that Patterson may not offer parol evidence regarding the 
unambiguous documents of record filed with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder pertaining to the real property at issue in this 
lawsuit. 
8* The Court also enters summary judgment against 
Patterson and in favor of Interstate on Patterson's Fourth and 
Fifth Affirmative Defenses because the Court hereby rules as a 
matter of law that all necessary parties are before the Court. 
9. Because the Court has entered summary judgment on 
all issues raised in Interstate1s complaint and on all 
affirmative defenses raised in Patterson's Answer, this is a 
final order adjudicating all issues raised by the parties in 
the above-captioned proceeding. 
ENTERED 
BY THE COURT: 
this M^  day of^ AugtHft, 1986 
ixS^OJ^jJy, 
District Judge ^Phillip R. -Fich-tgT 
ATT.; — 
Py f<f)K
 t J duAok. 
Daputy Cleric 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Pursuant to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, the 
undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing proposed form 
of "Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Against Defendant" was served on opposing counsel before being 
presented to the Court for signature. A copy of the foregoing 
proposed Order was served on counsel listed below by mail, 
postage prepaid, this / <>T day of August, 1986, and will be 
presented to the Court not before the \\ - day of August, 1986: 
Ralph J. Hafen 
Attorney for Defendant 
402 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney for Proposed Plaintiffs 
in Intervention Melvin E. Ingersoll, 
Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. 
Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
r t ^ f c ^ J - £ > < ^ 
Patrick J. O'Hara 
Attorney for Interstate Land 
Corporation 
47860 
080186 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER 
CIVIL NO. C 85-790 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R. D. PATTERSON 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the court on the motions of 
defendant R. D. Patterson and proposed Intervenors to correct 
previous orders. The motions are expressly premised on Rules 
59(a)(6) and (7), 59(d), 59(e), 60(b), U.R.C.P., "or other 
applicable rules" and are directed at the following orders: 
1. Order Denying Motion to Intervene Filed by Melvin E. 
Ingersoll, Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll, 
and Evelyn E. Ingersoll, dated September 4, 1986 
(hereinafter referred to as the "order denying 
intervention"). 
2. Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Defendant, dated September 4, 1986 (hereinafter 
referred to as "summary judgment order"). 
The motions in question are contained in a single pleading 
dated September 13, 1986 and filed on September 15, 1986. It 
ooov^ 
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was plaintiff, however, that caused the motions to be heard by 
the court on October 20, 1986, by its filing of a Notice of 
Hearing. 
The court heard the arguments of counsel on October 20, 
1986, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and took the matter under advisement. 
Thereafter, the court reviewed the entire file, including 
specifically the plaintiff's original Motion for Summary Judgment 
and supporting papers, the original Motion to Intervene and 
Proposed Complaint in Intervention and the transcript of the 
hearing of May 5, 1986 on the plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and proposed Intervenors1 Motion to Intervene 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the original motions"). 
The following procedural facts are significant: 
1. The original motions were fully presented to the court 
and argued on May 5, 1986. No legal memoranda, brief or 
evidence were submitted by the defendant or the proposed 
Intervenors. At that hearing, counsel for the proposed 
Intervenors proposed to submit a post hearing memorandum 
(Tr. p. 13) but none was forthcoming. 
2. The court, per Judge Fishier, took the matter under 
advisement and thereafter issued his ruling by means of a 
minute entry dated July 28, 1986. 
3. Proposed written orders incorporating the court's ruling 
were mailed by plaintiff to opposing counsel on August 1, 
1986. Defendant and proposed Intervenors did not object to 
,,^( \*± *T*£i 
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the form or substance of these proposed orders• Thereafter, 
on September 4, 1986, the order denying intervention and the 
summary judgment order were entered by the court per Judge 
Daniels, Judge Fishier having previously resigned his 
position on the court• 
4. The tenth day following entry of the summary judgment 
order fell on a weekend and defendant filed the motions 
challenging the summary judgment order on September 15, 
1986, the next succeeding day which was not a weekend or 
legal holiday. Consequently, if such motions were proper 
under Rule 59, U.R.C.P., they were timely filed under Rule 
59(b). 
The primary issue presented is whether the motions in 
question are truly Rule 59 motions. The resolution of this issue 
impacts not only the consideration of the motions by this court 
but, more significantly, the finality of the judgment in question 
and thus the timeliness of any appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Utah. For the reasons set forth below, this court deems the 
motions as not properly filed under Rule 59. 
The motions in question are premised in part on Rule 
59(a)(6) and (7) and 59(d). Each of these subdivisions expressly 
reference a "new trial" as the contemplated relief. 
Consequently, they are applicable only when a trial has preceded 
the motion. In summary judgment proceedings no trial takes place 
and, in accordance with Rule 52(a), findings and conclusions are 
nni H.79 
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unnecessary. Thus, a challenge to the entry of the summary 
judgment order cannot be premised on subdivisions (a) or (d) of 
Rule 59. Additionally, Rule 52(b) is inapplicable to the summary 
judgment proceedings. 
The remaining question under Rule 59 is whether subdivision 
(e) is a proper vehicle to challenge the rendering of a summary 
judgment. Depending on the resolution of this remaining 
question, a further issue may be whether Rule 59(e) is 
appropriate to challenge a summary judgment when no new evidence, 
fact or even legal argument is presented in support of the Rule 
59(e) motion. 
Rule 59(e), which is identical to Rule 59(e) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, has been a part of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure from their inception. Rule 59(e) was, however, 
an addition to the federal rules in the 1946 amendments. The 
Advisory Committee Notes to the federal rules indicate that 
subdivision (e) was M... added to care for a situation such as 
that arising in Boaz v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, ... 146 
F.2d 321 [(8th Cir. 1944)] and makes clear that the district 
court possesses the power asserted in that case to alter or amend 
a judgment after its entry." In Boaz the court held that the 
district court had inherent power to amend a judgment of 
dismissal without prejudice to a judgment of dismissal with 
prejudice. While such power of amendment inheres in the court 
rendering the judgment, the use of Rule 59(e) for amendment of 
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judgment is applicable in very limited situations such as those 
presented in Boaz. The Advisory Committee Notes themselves thus 
suggest that Rule 59(e) was not intended for the wholesale 
challenge of judgments when the other provisions of Rule 59 do 
not apply. 
In the instant case, the Rule 59(e) motion does pose a 
wholesale attack on the summary judgment order. While cast as a 
Rule 59 motion, it is in fact a motion to reconsider. There are 
various specific rules which allow a party to seek reconsidera-
tion following a trial. Rules 50(b), 52(b) and Rule 59, U.R.C.P. 
The logical place for a similar rule upon which to premise a 
reconsideration of a summary judgment would be in a subdivision 
of Rule 56. No such rule, however, exists. 
Provision of an express and specific mechanism to reconsider 
a final judgment, such as those prescribed in Rules 50(b), 52((b) 
and 59, is necessary so that a motion for reconsideration can 
stay the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal. To 
allow Rule 59(e) to be used as a catchall means to seek 
reconsideration of any final judgment merely provides a means to 
challenge the integrity and finality of this court's judgments 
and allows the moving party further time within which to file an 
appeal. 
There are numerous thresholds in summary judgment 
proceedings in which a party opposing the motion may be heard. 
Quite obviously, the party may submit opposing papers, memoranda 
nntilSl 
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and briefs and be heard at oral argument• Following any hearing 
and while the court has the matter under advisement, the party 
opposing the motion may make further submissions. Even if the 
matter is not taken under advisement, a signed judgment is always 
necessary under Rule 58A. Rule 2.9 of the District Court Rules 
of Practice requires service of a proposed judgment on opposing 
counsel and allows five days for objection. Only then can the 
final judgment be entered. Thus, Rule 2.9 provides the opposing 
party with an opportunity by means of objection to convince the 
court that its previously ruling was erroneous. No further 
mechanism for reconsideration is necessary or desirable. 
The instant case is illustrative. The plaintiff originally 
presented this matter to the court on May 5, 1986, in a hearing 
on its Motion for Summary Judgment. Defense counsel had the 
opportunity to file papers, memoranda, and affidavits in 
opposition. No such items were filed. Counsel for the proposed 
Intervenors filed a Motion to Intervene and a Proposed Complaint 
in Intervention. At the hearing on plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, defense counsel and counsel for the proposed 
Intervenors were heard. 
The court thereafter had the matter under advisement for 
over two months during which time defendants and the proposed 
Intervenors made no filings or submissions. While counsel for 
the proposed Intervenors did propose to file a post hearing 
memorandum (Tr. p. 13), none was forthcoming. It is particularly 
000182 
INTERSTATE V. PATTERSON PAGE SEVEN OPINION AND ORDER 
significant that at no time have defendant or the proposed 
Intervenors submitted affidavits or the like raising a genuine 
issue of material fact. Following the minute entry of July 28, 
1986, which was mailed to all counsel, neither defendant nor the 
proposed Intervenors requested this court to reconsider its 
ruling. Moreover, no objections to the proposed judgment 
submitted by plaintiff's counsel were interposed under Rule 2.9 
of the District Court Rules of Practice. 
Defendant and the proposed Intervenors now, however, seek to 
have this court reconsider its final judgment by means of its 
Rule 59 motions. At the hearing of October 20, 1986, counsel for 
defendant and intervenors admitted on the record that there was 
nothing before the court, including new legal arguments, that had 
not previously been submitted and argued at the May 5 hearing on 
the original motions. The only thing different was that there 
was a new judge, Judge Fishier having resigned before the formal 
entry of the written judgment. 
The courts which have addressed the issue are split, some 
holding that Rule 59(e) is not a proper vehicle to challenge a 
summary judgment and others holding to the contrary. E.g. , 
compare Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 344 F Supp. 367 (S.D. 
Fla. 1972) and Durkin v. Taylor, 444 F. Supp. 879, 889-90 (E. D. 
Va. 1977) with Sidney-Vinstein v. A. H. Robins Co., 697 F. 2d 
880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983) and Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, 
Ltd., 652 F. 2d 808 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Jetero Constr. Co. 
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v. South Memphis Lumber Co. , 531 F. 2d 1348, 1351-52 (6th Cir. 
1976). 
Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City# 590 P. 2d 309, 
310-311 (Utah 1979) addresses the issue from the standpoint of a 
denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus. To that extent it 
is instructive but not controlling in the context of a summary 
judgment. In the latter context many more opportunities are 
generally available for parties and advocates to present 
argument. Parties opposing summary judgment are also generally 
presented an opportunity by means of objections under Rule 2.9 to 
convince the court prior to entry of judgment that its ruling was 
erroneous. 
Even if Rule 59(e) was generally deemed a proper mechanism 
to challenge a summary judgment, it should not be deemed a proper 
use of such mechanism when no new fact, piece of evidence or even 
legal argument is presented in support of a Rule 59(e) motion or 
when a party opposing summary judgment fails to object to a 
proposed judgment under Rule 2.9. Under such circumstances, the 
party opposing summary judgment should pursue their remedy by 
appeal rather than a motion for reconsideration under the guise 
of Rule 59(e). 
For the reasons set forth above, defendant's Rule 59 motions 
are denied as being improperly premised on Rule 59. Proposed 
Intervenors1 motion for reconsideration cannot even be deemed to 
be premised on Rule 59 since they were not parties to the 
00018 
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proceeding when summary judgment was granted• In the event this 
matter is appealed and this court's view of Rule 59 is correct, 
plaintiff might be able to avoid some of the additional delay by 
moving for summary disposition under Rule 10, U.R.A.P. on the 
grounds that the notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days 
following judgment. 
Because the Utah Supreme Court could disagree with the views 
expressed herein and to avoid any possible remand solely for this 
court to reconsider its judgment pursuant to the defendant's Rule 
59 motions, the court has considered the entire record and finds 
no manifest error underlying the orders entered on September 4, 
1986. The court particularly notes that it has not yet been 
presented with any matter by defendant or otherwise which tends 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact. For these reasons, 
even if defendant's motions should be deemed properly presented 
under Rule 59, the motions are denied. 
The court further denies defendant's motion under Rule 60(b) 
for the reason that it is a motion to reconsider and is not 
properly premised on the grounds specified in Rule 60(b). See 
Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 367 (S.D. Fla, 
1972) . The only surprise that has been asserted was expressly 
asserted at the May 5, 1986 hearing, over four months preceding 
the filing of these motions, and no further memorandum was filed 
after the May 5 hearing as promised. 
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
00018s 
INTERSTATE V, PATTERSON PAGE TEN OPINION AND ORDER 
defendant's and proposed Interveners1 motions under Rule 59(a)(6) 
and (7), 59(d), 59(e), 60(b), U.R.C.P., "or other applicable 
rules" are hereby denied. 
DATED THIS 2nd day of December, 1986, 
GtXSK 
BY—< % M / / ^ < ^ ^ ^ a C 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Opinion and Order, postage prepaid, to 
Ronald C. Barker, Esq. 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Patrick O'Hara, Esq. 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Ralph J. Hafen, Esq. 
402 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
This >? 
84101 
day of December, 1986. 
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